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INTRODUCTION
In the early hours of December 28, 2014, a seventeen-year-old
transgender girl named Leelah Alcorn left her home in Kings Mills,
Ohio, and walked three miles to Interstate 71.1 Before leaving,
Alcorn had set up her Tumblr2 account to automatically upload a post
entitled “Suicide Note.”3 At 2:20 AM, Alcorn walked onto the sixlane highway and stepped in front of a tractor-trailer.4 A few hours
later, the post appeared on Alcorn’s Tumblr page: “If you are reading
this, it means that I have committed suicide and obviously failed to
delete this post from my queue.”5

1. Tracy Connor, ‘Fix Society’: Transgender Teen Leelah Alcorn Posted Plea
NBC
NEWS
(Dec.
31,
2014,
4:44
PM),
Suicide,
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/fix-society-transgender-teen-leelah-alcornposted-plea-suicide-n277666 [https://perma.cc/JXM2-Z829]; Hayley MacMillen,
Trans Teen Leaves Tumblr Suicide Note Before Her Death, REFINERY29 (Apr. 29,
2015, 6:50 PM), http://www.refinery29.com/2014/12/80149/leelah-alcorn-transteenager-suicide-letter [https://perma.cc/WV67-YH5D]; Gillian Moheny, Leelah
Alcorn: Transgender Teen’s Reported Suicide Note Makes Dramatic Appeal, ABC
NEWS (Dec. 31, 2014, 1:00 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/US/leelah-alcorn-transgenderteens-reported-suicide-note-makes/story?id=27912326
[https://perma.cc/6ZUPADU7].
2. Tumblr is a social media platform where individuals can post public blog
posts. See TUMBLR, http://www.tumblr.com [https://perma.cc/9DGP-656J].
3. MacMillen, supra note 1.
4. Id.
5. Fallon Fox, Leelah Alcorn’s Suicide: Conversion Therapy Is Child Abuse,
TIME (Jan. 8, 2015), http://time.com/3655718/leelah-alcorn-suicide-transgendertherapy [https://perma.cc/P8DE-595P] (linking to the actual note at
https://web.archive.org/web/20150102043958/http://lazerprincess.tumblr.com
[https://perma.cc/X7K9-3GF7]).
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In her post, Alcorn explained why she chose to take her life.6 She
described the feelings of gender nonconformity she had experienced
since she was four, and the joy she felt when she found an explanation
for these feelings.7 “When I was 14,” Alcorn wrote, “I learned what
transgender meant and cried of happiness. After 10 years of
confusion I finally understood who I was.”8 In her post, Alcorn also
explained how her parents did not accept her identity, and the toll this
took on her.9 Alcorn’s letter stated, “[w]hen I was 16 I realized that
my parents would never come around, and that I would have to wait
until I was 18 to start any sort of transitioning treatment, which
absolutely broke my heart. The longer you wait, the harder it is to
transition. I felt hopeless, that I was just going to look like a man in
drag for the rest of my life.”10 Alcorn ended her post by stating: “My
death needs to mean something. My death needs to be counted in the
number of transgender people who commit suicide this year. I want
someone to look at that number and say ‘that’s fucked up’ and fix it.
Fix society. Please.”11
Alcorn’s death drew widespread attention from media outlets and
advocacy groups. Commentators wrote that Alcorn’s letter shed light
on the painful experience that many transgender youth face.12
Reports of the incident cited the disproportionately high rate of
suicide attempts among transgender youth.13 Prominent transgender
writers and actors, such as Laverne Cox, described their own suicide

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Jennifer Finney Boylan, How to Save Your Life: A Response to
Leelah Alcorn’s Suicide Note, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2015, at A23; Zack Ford, Leelah
Alcorn and the Quiet Genocide of Transgender People, THINK PROGRESS (Dec. 31,
2014, 1:33 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/lgbt/2014/12/31/3607382/leelah-alcorntransgender-genocide [https://perma.cc/37P9-VVW6]; Kat Haché, What Leelah
Alcorn’s Death Means to Me As a Transgender Woman and Advocate, BUSTLE
(Dec. 31, 2014), http://www.bustle.com/articles/56324-what-leelah-alcorns-deathmeans-to-me-as-a-transgender-woman-and-advocate; Emma Margolin, Leelah
Alcorn’s Suicide Note Pointed Out Societal Problems, MSNBC (Jan. 3, 2015, 4:01
PM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/leelah-alcorns-suicide-note-pointed-out-societalproblems [https://perma.cc/7FWZ-ZZ5H].
13. Arnold H. Grossman & Anthony R. D’Augelli, Transgender Youth and LifeThreatening Behaviors, 35 SUICIDE & LIFE THREATENING BEHAV. 527, 532 (2007)
(finding that forty-five percent of participants had seriously considered committing
suicide, and twenty-six percent had engaged in life-threatening behavior such as
suicide attempts).
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attempts to bring more attention to the issue.14 With this publicity,
Alcorn’s death became a part of a larger conversation about
transgender rights and gender-affirming policies.15
Some
commentators argued that improved access to the gender-affirming
healthcare that Alcorn sought could reduce the suicide attempt rate
among transgender youth and ultimately save lives.16
Health organizations such as the American Psychiatric Association
(APA),17 the World Health Organization,18 the American Medical
Association (AMA),19 the Endocrine Society,20 the American

14. Beth Sherouse, Laverne Cox on Leelah Alcorn and Transgender Youth on
HUM.
RTS.
CAMPAIGN
BLOG
(Jan.
9,
2105),
View,
http://www.hrc.org/blog/entry/laverne-cox-on-leelah-alcorn-and-transgender-youthon-the-view [https://perma.cc/6LJ7-SRSH].
15. In the wake of Alcorn’s death, advocates petitioned Congress to ban
“conversion therapy”—psychotherapy aimed at changing an individual’s gender
identity or sexual orientation—which Alcorn’s parents forced her to attend. See
Mitch Kellaway, Petition for ‘Leelah’s Law’ Banning Conversion Therapy Heads to
White
House,
ADVOCATE
(Jan.
30,
2015,
3:21
PM),
http://www.advocate.com/politics/transgender/2015/01/30/petition-leelahs-lawbanning-conversion-therapy-heads-white-house [https://perma.cc/C6EH-U7JU]. A
congresswoman drafted a Concurrent Resolution that “encourages each state to
protect minors from efforts that promote or promise to change sexual orientation,
gender identity, or gender expression, based on the premise that being lesbian, gay,
bisexual, transgender, or gender nonconforming is a mental illness or developmental
disorder that can or should be cured.” H.R. Con. Res. 36, 114th Cong. (2015).
Alcorn’s death has also brought more light to the violence that transwomen are
subjected to as commentators noted the disproportionate media attention that
Alcorn’s death received when compared to the growing trend of murders of
transgender women of color. Eunbyul Lee, Who Gets To Be Human in Death?:
Leelah Alcorn and Trans Legacies, BLACK GIRL DANGEROUS (Jan. 6, 2015),
http://www.blackgirldangerous.org/2015/01/gets-human-death-leelah-alcorn-translegacies [https://perma.cc/GNW9-MGVF] (noting that while transgender people of
color face disproportionately high murder and violence rates compared to white
transgender people, media coverage is racially fragmented: “While everyone is quick
to circulate petitions online in Leelah’s name and be distinguished as allies for the
trans community, why do they continue to turn a blind eye to the lives and deaths of
trans women of color? . . . When we fail to illuminate the dimmed narratives of trans
people of color while advocating for justice exclusively for white trans people, we
further notions of white supremacy.”).
16. Margolin, supra note 12. See infra Part I, for a discussion of gender-affirming
healthcare.
17. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 451–59 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-V].
18. International Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems,
WORLD
HEALTH
ORG.
(2015),
http://apps.who.int/classifications/icd10/browse/2015/en#/F60-F69
[https://perma.cc/FCN9-XENV] (classifying transsexualism and gender identity
disorder of childhood in adult mental and behavioral disorders).
19. AM. MED. ASS’N, HOUSE OF DELEGATES RESOLUTION 122: REMOVING
FINANCIAL BARRIERS TO CARE FOR TRANSGENDER PATIENTS 1 (2008) [hereinafter

The
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Academy of Family Physicians,21 the American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, and the American Psychological
Association have recognized a form of anxiety, termed gender
dysphoria (GD), that results from a discrepancy between an
individual’s sex identity assigned at birth and their gender identity.22
Mental health experts note that GD can exist during childhood and
adolescence and that gender-affirming healthcare can alleviate GD.23
Indeed, mental health organizations, such as AMA, have noted the
seriousness of GD and the medical necessity of gender-affirming
healthcare for certain individuals.24 Without access to genderaffirming healthcare, individuals experiencing GD may develop
“clinically significant psychological distress, dysfunction, debilitating
depression, and . . . suicidality.25” Thus, gender-affirming healthcare
may be necessary for at least some adolescents. Given the experience
of transgender youth like Leelah Alcorn, it is imperative for policy
makers to consider adolescent access to medically necessary genderaffirming healthcare.
The psychological effects of GD raise important concerns for
policymakers considering whether adolescents should have access to
medically necessary gender-affirming healthcare. In particular,
municipal governments and urban policymakers have an interest in
considering the costs and benefits of providing access to gender-

AMA RESOLUTION 122] (finding that “[a]n established body of medical research
demonstrates the effectiveness and medical necessity of mental health care, hormone
therapy and sex reassignment surgery as forms of therapeutic treatment for many
people diagnosed with [GD]”).
20. WYLIE C. HEMBREE ET AL., ENDOCRINE SOC’Y, ENDOCRINE TREATMENT OF
TRANSSEXUAL PERSONS: AN ENDOCRINE SOCIETY CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINE 7
(2009),
https://www.endocrine.org/~/media/endosociety/Files/Publications/Clinical%20Practi
ce%20Guidelines/Endocrine-Treatment-of-Transsexual-Persons.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JJ7V-P7RE] (providing a definition for “Gender Identity Disorder”
that tracks the definition in the DSM-IV).
21. AM. ACAD. OF FAMILY PHYSICIANS, RESOLUTION NO. 1004 (May 3, 2012),
http://www.aafp.org/dam/AAFP/documents/about_us/special_constituencies/2012RC
AR_Advocacy.pdf [https://perma.cc/E93B-JPV3].
22. M. Dru Levasseur, Gender Identity Defines Sex: Updating the Law to Reflect
Modern Medical Science Is Key to Transgender Rights, 39 VT. L. REV. 943, 953–54
(2015).
23. DSM-V, supra note 17, at 451–59; WORLD PROF’L ASS’N FOR TRANSGENDER
HEALTH, STANDARDS OF CARE FOR THE HEALTH OF TRANSSEXUAL, TRANSGENDER,
AND GENDER NONCONFORMING PEOPLE 8 (7th ed. 2012) [hereinafter WPATH].
24. AMA RESOLUTION 122, supra note 19.
25. Id.
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affirming healthcare to transgender individuals and youth.26 Urban
areas possess a high density of transgender individuals, including
transgender youth, since the geographic distribution of transgender
and gender non-conforming individuals roughly mirrors that of the
overall U.S. population.27 In addition, studies suggest that the
transgender population may be disproportionally eligible for
Medicaid due to the disparities in income and unemployment that are
likely the result of transphobia.28 As a result, the urban transgender
population consists of many individuals who are eligible for Medicaid
and other services. Transgender youth may be particularly vulnerable
and in need of medical services in urban areas, as reports on runaway
homeless youth populations suggest that transgender youth are
disproportionally represented in the homeless population.29 These
youth typically move to urban areas where identity-based homeless
services organizations that are best prepared to serve transgender
youth are based.30 Municipal governments and urban policymakers
therefore have a particular interest in trans youth31 access to genderaffirming healthcare.
Despite the medical community’s recognition that gender-affirming
healthcare is medically necessary for certain transgender youth, many
are unable to gain access to it. Some, like Alcorn, are deterred from
transitioning by their parents or families, while others find that they

26. JAMIE M. GRANT ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY,
INJUSTICE AT EVERY TURN: A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL TRANSGENDER
DISCRIMINATION
SURVEY
10
(2011),
http://www.thetaskforce.org/static_html/downloads/reports/reports/ntds_full.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XAP8-XCGD].
27. Id.
28. Levasseur, supra note 22, at 949–51. “Transphobia” may be defined to mean
negative attitudes directed towards trans people because of their transgender
identity. Talia Mae Bettcher, Transphobia, 1 TSQ: TRANSGENDER STUD. Q. 249, 249
(2014).
29. NICHOLAS RAY, NAT’L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE POLICY INST., LESBIAN,
GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER YOUTH: AN EPIDEMIC OF HOMELESSNESS 4
(2006),
http://www.thetaskforce.org/static_html/downloads/HomelessYouth.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8F2R-GLU3]; see also NICO SIFRA QUINTANA ET AL., CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS, ON THE STREETS: THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO GAY AND TRANSGENDER
HOMELESS YOUTH
1
(June
2010),
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wpcontent/uploads/issues/2010/06/pdf/lgbtyouthhomelessness.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C9E2-D3B4].
30. QUINTANA ET AL., supra note 29, at 17.
31. “Trans youth” is a common shorthand for transgender youth. See generally
Sonja Shield, The Doctor Won’t See You Now: Rights of Transgender Adolescents
to Sex Reassignment Treatment, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 361 (2007).
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cannot afford the costly treatments and appointments.32 While many
private insurers have begun to cover gender-affirming healthcare,33
the majority of state Medicaid programs do not.34 Thus, in recent
years, trans-rights activists have advocated for greater access to
gender-affirming healthcare.
New York, California, Vermont,
Oregon, Massachusetts, and Washington D.C. have lifted the bans in
their Medicaid programs for coverage of gender-affirming healthcare,
but several of these states restrict coverage on the basis of age,
requiring individuals to wait until they are eighteen to receive
treatment.35
Given the importance of gender-affirming healthcare for
transgender youth, this Note considers whether age-based restrictions
on Medicaid coverage of this healthcare are necessary and good
policy. Part I of this Note provides context for the policy and law
regarding gender-affirming healthcare and discusses the terms and
rhetorical framing that mental health experts, trans-rights advocates,
and legislators use to describe gender-affirming healthcare. In
addition, it outlines the empirical research that supports the
commonly held view of the mental health field that gender-affirming
healthcare may be a medical necessity for transgender individuals.
Lastly, it outlines the three approaches that states have taken to cover
or exclude gender-affirming healthcare from Medicaid.
Part II examines the New York Medicaid program, which restricts
coverage of gender-affirming healthcare on the basis of age. This
Part also identifies the ways in which an age-based exclusion for
Medicaid coverage of medically necessary treatment may conflict

32. MARY ANN HORTON, OUT & EQUAL WORKPLACE SUMMIT, THE COST OF
TRANSGENDER
HEALTH
BENEFITS
4
(2008),
http://www.tgender.net/taw/thb/THBCost-OE2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/S8TJ-ZJ4Z]
(noting that the overall cost of medically necessary surgeries by United States
transsexuals was $19.3 million in 2001); Samantha Leal, I Can’t Afford to Transition:
The Unseen Costs of Being Transgender in 2015, MARIE CLAIRE (July 21, 2015),
http://www.marieclaire.com/culture/news/a15164/transgender-operation-procedurecosts/ [https://perma.cc/CAZ8-FVXC].
33. Finding Insurance for Transgender-Related Healthcare, HUM. RTS.
CAMPAIGN (Aug. 1, 2015), http://www.hrc.org/resources/entry/finding-insurance-fortransgender-related-healthcare [https://perma.cc/3ZP3-VJL5].
34. Jennifer L. Casazza, Sex Reassignment Surgery: Required for Transgendered
Prisoners but Forbidden for Medicaid, Medicare, and CHAMPUS Beneficiaries, 20
WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 625, 642–45 (2014).
35. See George Liam Steptoe, Gender-Affirming Coverage for Transgender
People Under Proposed Medicaid Reform, NY CITY LENS (Feb. 5, 2015),
http://nycitylens.com/2015/02/how-cuomos-medicaid-reforms-can-help-thetransgender-community/ [https://perma.cc/HU3S-RG4Y]; see also N.Y. COMP. CODES
R. & REGS. tit. 18, §§ 505.2(l)(1)-(l)(2) (2016).
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with the doctrine of informed consent, thereby potentially giving rise
to litigation under the Affordable Care Act and enforcement actions
by the Department of Health and Human Services.
Finally, Part III of this Note asserts that amending Medicaid
programs to cover gender-affirming healthcare for transgender youth
on a case-by-case basis would avoid the issues that an age-based
exclusion presents. This Part argues that a case-by-case approach
would align with the doctrine of informed consent and its exceptions,
avoid litigation by providing medically necessary coverage in a nondiscriminatory manner, and prevent the negative outcomes that beset
too many transgender youth.
I. MEDICAID COVERAGE OF GENDER-AFFIRMING
HEALTHCARE
As trans-rights advocates have pushed discussion of gender beyond
a binary formulation, the rhetorical framing of gender and genderaffirming healthcare has become increasingly central. This Part
provides background on gender-affirming healthcare and the
language and terms that this Note will use to describe genderaffirming healthcare and the treatment of GD. In addition, this Part
details the widely held medical consensus regarding transgenderrelated healthcare and the approaches health professionals have
found that can alleviate the distress caused by GD. Last, this Part
describes the extent to which states have extended Medicaid coverage
for gender-affirming healthcare and will describe the age-based
restrictions in New York’s Medicaid regulation.
A. Definitions and Terms Used to Discuss Gender-Affirming
Healthcare
Language that categorizes and defines people on the basis of sex
and gender both frames society’s outlook on sex and is subject to
society’s cultural values.36 Such language runs the risk of instilling or
reinforcing systems of sexual inequality and normativity.37 For
instance, a binary understanding of sex and gender that categorizes all
individuals as either male or female on the basis of criteria founded

36. See GENNY BEEMYN & SUSAN RANKIN, THE LIVES OF TRANSGENDER PEOPLE
16 (2011).
37. See id. at 17; see also Mary Alice Adams, Traversing the Transcape: A Brief
Historical Etymology of Trans* Terminology, in TRANSGENDER COMMUNICATION
STUDIES: HISTORIES, TRENDS, AND TRAJECTORIES 173, 179–81 (2015) (noting that
language works to frame narratives about transgender identity “in a manner that
privileges hegemonic cisnormativity”).
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on ideas of “maleness” and “femaleness” works to marginalize
individuals who do not meet these criteria.38
Advocates of
transgender rights have thus pushed for changes in terminology to
counter this marginalization.39 In particular, trans-rights activists and
queer linguists have used language as a means of challenging a binary
understanding of gender and the view of gender nonconformity as a
mental illness or disorder.40 In this manner, language may be viewed
as not merely descriptive, but political, and some scholars argue that
all language that categorizes or classifies transgender people, by its
nature, is not neutral.41 The terms used to classify medical treatments
that are medically necessary for many transgender individuals are
similarly not neutral and risk pathologizing gender-nonconformity.42
The notion of sex is central to any discussion involving the
recognition of transgender rights under the law. A common
misconception of sex is that it is assigned at birth as either male or
female on the basis of external genitalia.43 Genitalia, however, is not

38. Anne Fausto-Sterling, The Five Sexes, Revisited, 40 SCIENCES 18, 23 (2000)
(arguing that “one can find levels of masculinity and femininity in almost every
possible permutation” and that “[t]he medical and scientific communities have yet to
adopt a language that is capable of describing such diversity . . . . Hence legal
protection for people whose cultural and physical genitals do not match is needed
during the current transition to a more gender-diverse world.”).
39. Adams, supra note 37, at 179 (arguing for the development of more gender
terms as a means of conferring existence and that the “absence of a gender label that
fits may feel like symbolic annihilation”).
40. WPATH, supra note 23, at 5 (noting that “[a] disorder is a description of
something with which a person might struggle, not a description of the person or the
person’s identity”).
41. BEEMYN & RANKIN, supra note 36, at 16–17 (citing J. WOOD, GENDERED
LIVES: COMMUNICATION, GENDER AND CULTURE (2d ed. 1997)).
42. Id. at 16–17. While acknowledging the political implications of rhetorical
framing, this Note addresses state regulations that bar access to gender-affirming
healthcare on the basis of particular nomenclature and classifications. The terms
used in this Note are not intended to marginalize, impose cultural norms, or
pathologize gender nonconforming identities. However, in order to clearly address
the statutes, it will be necessary to use the terms of these regulations and even adopt
their framing of gender dysphoria in a manner which may appear to pathologize the
experience of gender non-conforming and transgender individuals. For example,
discussing “treatment” of GD as a medical need may work to pathologize the
transgender experience or suggest that gender nonconformity requires medical
attention.
43. Levasseur, supra note 22, at 982–83 (citing Julie A. Greenberg, Defining Male
and Female: Intersexuality and the Collision Between Law and Biology, 41 ARIZ. L.
REV. 265, 278–79 (1999)) (arguing that separating tangible sex characteristics for
psychological sex characteristics “reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of sex.
The etiology of sex reveals that it is a multi-faceted determination.”).
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the sole factor determining one’s sex.44 Medical experts define sex on
the basis of at least eight attributes, including an individual’s internal
morphologic sex, external genitalia, gonadal sex, chromosomal sex,
phenotypic sex (secondary sex characteristics), hormonal sex,
assigned sex, and gender identity.45 The problematic formulation of
sex on the basis of genitalia, or other physical characteristics, alone is
seen in the experience of intersex individuals.46 Roughly 1.7% of the
world’s population does not conform to chromosomal, gonadal,
hormonal, or genital standards for either assigned sex.47 Such
individuals are often subjected to medical interventions, including
surgery while they are still infants, so as to make their genitals more
easily reflect male or female genitalia.48 Given the uncertainty of
whether such “corrective” procedures are necessary, and the reality
that gender identity may not “match” the sex assigned through
surgery, scholars argue that these interventions are merely
justifications for classifying people as one sex or the other.49
Psychologists have thus begun to understand sexual identity as

44. Id. (“Sex determinations have not always been based on ‘genital
shorthand.’”).
45. JULIE GREENBERG, INTERSEXUALITY AND THE LAW: WHY SEX MATTERS 11
(2012) (citing Melanie Blackless et al., How Sexually Dimorphic Are We? Review
and Synthesis, 12 AM. J. HUM. BIOLOGY 151, 161 (2000)); see also WPATH, supra
note 23, at 97 (defining the term “sex”).
46. Ilana Gelfman, Because of Intersex: Intersexuality, Title VII, and the Reality
of Discrimination “Because of . . . [Perceived] Sex”, 34 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 55, 62 (2010) (“[T]he intersex body fits the definition of neither a male nor a
female body—and that it defies the gender binary so commonly assumed by
individuals and the law.”).
47. BEEMYN & RANKIN, supra note 36, at 18; see also PEGGY T. COHEN-KETTENIS
& FRIEDMAN PFÄFFLIN, TRANSGENDERISM AND INTERSEXUALITY IN CHILDHOOD
AND ADOLESCENCE 24, 41 (2003) (“[E]stimates of intersexuality climb to include
nearly two percent of the population.”).
48. The practice of “corrective” surgeries for intersex infants is common. See Noa
Ben-Asher, The Necessity of Sex Change: A Struggle for Intersex and Transsex
Liberties, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 51, 60–61 (2006) (citing Am. Acad. of Pediatrics,

Evaluation of the Newborn with Developmental Anomalies of the External
Genitalia, 106 PEDIATRICS 138, 139 (2000)); see also BEEMYN & RANKIN, supra note
36, at 18. Pediatric guidelines advise for the injection of testosterone or the removal
of testes where the child is born with a penis less than two centimeters. Id. Similarly,
medical standards do not allow clitorises larger than 0.9 centimeters at birth. Id.; see
also Chineyere Ezie, Deconstructing the Body: Transgender and Intersex Identities
and Sex Discrimination – The Need for Strict Scrutiny, 20 COLUM. J. GENDER & L.
141, 146–47 (2011) (discussing the standards that determine a “normal” clitoris or
“adequate” penis that need not be operated on in order to “ensure that intersex
patients end up [as] functioning heterosexuals”).
49. See, e.g., BEEMYN & RANKIN, supra note 36, at 18–19.
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consisting of a greater number of factors, any of which may be
determinative.50
Gender identity, in contrast, is not assigned, but is rather a person’s
own intrinsic sense of being male, female, or an alternative gender.51
For most individuals, gender identity is sufficiently close to their
assigned sex so as to be consistent with their gender expression.52 The
term “cisgender” is used to describe people whose gender identity is
aligned with their sex assignment at birth.53 However, the gender
identity of some individuals differs from the normative expectations
of their assigned sex.54 Centering gender identity on the individual’s
own sense of self allows for a more nuanced and accurate
understanding of gender and properly acknowledges that gendernonconforming individuals may cross-identify with either gender or
may not conform to a binary understanding of gender at all.55
GD, formerly known as gender identity disorder,56 is understood by
the medical community as mental distress caused by a discrepancy

50. Id. at 17.
51. Individuals may identify outside the binary of male and female and, instead,
identify with an alternative gender identity or identities. Given the emphasis on
defining one’s own gender identity, the labels for gender nonconforming identities
are not comprehensive, may overlap, and likely work to confound and confuse
notions of a gender binary. Some labels include agender, genderqueer, bigender,
trigender, neutrois, genderfluid, trans, transmasculine, transfeminine, bear, butch,
femme, boi, demiboy, demigirl, genderfree, and androgyne. WPATH, supra note 23,
at 96; Adams, supra note 37, at 179–81; Vanessa Vitiello Urquhart, What the Heck Is
Genderqueer?,
SLATE
(Mar.
24,
2015,
10:00
AM),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2015/03/24/genderqueer_what_does_it_mean_an
d_where_does_it_come_from.html
[https://perma.cc/2JS6-JQZA];
Some
Genderqueer Identities, GENDER QUEERIES: FOR ALL YOUR GENDERQUEER AND
NON-BINARY
NEEDS,
http://genderqueeries.tumblr.com/identities
[https://perma.cc/8XZT-MBV8].
52. Shuvo Ghosh, Gender Identity, MEDSCAPE (Mar. 16, 2016),
http://emedicine.medscape.com/article/917990-overview
[https://perma.cc/HA5V55P4]; see WPATH, supra note 23, at 97.
53. Cisgender is a useful term as it challenges cisnormativity, or the cultural
notion that it is “normal” for one’s gender identity to align with one’s sex assignment
at birth. The term is derived from the Latin root cis, meaning “on the same side as.”
B. Aultman, Cisgender, 1 TSQ: TRANSGENDER STUD. Q. 61, 61 (2014),
http://tsq.dukejournals.org/content/1/1-2/61.full.pdf+html?sid=0a257206-1e7b-4d01baf6-16ebfb5e3d6b; see also Julia Serano, Keynote lecture presented at the 8th
Annual Philadelphia Trans-Health Conference: Psychology, Sexualization and TransInvalidations
(Jun.
12,
2009),
http://www.juliaserano.com/av/SeranoTransInvalidations.pdf [https://perma.cc/D5Y3-YF64].
54. WPATH, supra note 23, at 97.
55. BEEMYN & RANKIN, supra note 36, at 20.
56. The APA renamed Gender Identity Disorder as Gender Dysphoria in 2013 as
part of its release of the DSM-V. Gender Dysphoria Fact Sheet, AM. PSYCHIATRIC
ASS’N
(2013)
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between a person’s gender identity and that person’s assigned sex.57
GD is listed in the APA’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (DSM-V),58 which is the standard classification
system for mental disorders that mental health professionals in the
United States use.59 GD has been the subject of mental health studies
for more than thirty years.60 Studies have found that GD can be
alleviated with individual treatment, which may or may not include
physical interventions such as hormone therapy or surgeries.61
Indeed, the APA and AMA have acknowledged that genderaffirming healthcare may be necessary to alleviate GD.62 It is
important to note, however, that not all individuals who are gendernonconforming experience GD, nor will all individuals who
experience GD require physical interventions.63 Further, health
professionals have made clear that GD is to be distinguished from
gender nonconformity.64 Gender nonconformity, as an identity, is not
to be understood as a mental disorder, while GD, which entails a
feeling of distress or anxiety, may be understood as clinically

http://www.dsm5.org/documents/gender%20dysphoria%20fact%20sheet.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M4GM-97HR]. The APA made this decision because it sought to
reclassify gender identity disorder with a term that would protect transgender
individuals’ “access to care and [would not] be used against them in social,
occupational, or legal areas.” Id. Additionally, the APA noted that “replacing
‘disorder’ with ‘dysphoria’ in the diagnostic label is not only more appropriate and
consistent with familiar clinical sexology terminology, it also removes the connotation
that the patient is ‘disordered.’” Id. It is also worth noting that the APA considered
removing the condition from the DSM-V but was concerned that doing so would
jeopardize access to care. Id.
57. WPATH, supra note 23, at 96 (defining the term “gender dysphoria”).
58. DSM-V, supra note 17, at 451–59.
59. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), AM.
PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, http://www.psychiatry.org/practice/dsm [https://perma.cc/9VNCYN6C].
60. See Ciaran Judge et al., Gender Dysphoria—Prevalence and Co-Morbidities
in an Irish Adult Population, 5 FRONTIERS IN ENDOCRINOLOGY 1, 3 (2014).
61. WPATH, supra note 23, at 5.
62. AMA RESOLUTION 122, supra note 19 (finding that treatment for GD is
medically necessary); Gunter Heylens et al., Effects of Different Steps in Gender

Reassignment Therapy on Psychopathology: A Prospective Study of Persons with a
Gender Identity Disorder, 11 J. MED. 119, 123–24 (2014) (finding that sex-affirming
surgery lowered the overall level of psychoneurotic distress in individuals displaying
signs of GD, to levels that of the general population).
63. Heylens et al., supra note 62, at 124.
64. Id.
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significant distress that warrants mental health treatment.65 The APA
has recognized that children and adolescents may experience GD.66
The phrase gender-affirming healthcare refers to all psychological
and medical procedures or treatments necessary to treat GD,
including hormone therapy and gender-affirming surgery. While
gender-affirming healthcare is also often referred to as transitionrelated healthcare, or gender transition healthcare, the use of genderaffirming healthcare may be most in line with the goal of GD
treatment: to affirm an individual’s gender identity.67 Genderaffirming surgery, also termed gender reassignment surgery or sex
reassignment surgery, refers to surgical interventions that are
intended to treat GD by modifying primary and/or secondary sex
characteristics.68
The term “transgender” is an umbrella term that includes all
individuals who cross or transcend culturally prescribed gender
norms.69 The gender identity of transgender people differs in varying
degrees from the sex they were assigned at birth, and consequently,
the extent that transgender individuals may desire to acquire the
physical characteristics of another sex may vary as well.70 However,
requiring or desiring gender-affirming treatment is not determinative
of being transgender. Given the broad framing of the term,
transgender individuals may also not seek to acquire the physical

65. Id.; Eli Coleman et al., World, Prof’l Ass’n for Transgender Health, Standards
of Care for the Health of Transsexual, Transgender, and Gender-Nonconforming
People, Version 7, 13 INT’L J. TRANSGENDERISM 165, 168 (2011).
66. See infra Section I.B.
67. Levasseur, supra note 22, at 956–57; see also Brynn Tannenhill, Myths About
Gender
Affirmation
Surgery,
102
POLARE
25,
27
(2015)
http://www.gendercentre.org.au/documents/polare/Polare-102.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G6SE-XGAH].
68. Surgical procedures may include breast or chest surgeries such as
augmentation mammoplasty or subcutaneous mastectomy; genital surgeries such as
penectomy,
orchiectomy,
vaginoplasty,
clitoroplasty,
vulvoplasty,
hysterectomy/salpingo-oophorectomy, urethra reconstruction, possibly combined
with a metoidioplasy or with a phalloplasty, vaginectomy, scrotoplasty, and
implantation of erection and/or testicular prosthese; facial feminization surgery,
liposuction, lipofilling, voice surgery, thyroid cartilage reduction, gluteal
augmentation (implants/lipofilling), hair reconstruction, pectoral implants, and
various procedures that facilitate a person being perceived as the gender with which
they identify. WPATH, supra note 23, at 57.
69. Id. at 97.
70. Id.; Jack Drescher, From Bisexuality to Intersexuality: Rethinking Gender
Categories, 43 CONTEMP. PSYCHOANALYSIS 204, 208 (2007).
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characteristics of another sex, or might not experience GD.71 As the
World Professional Association for Transgender Health (WPATH)
standards note, “[o]nly some gender-nonconforming people
experience gender dysphoria at some point in their lives.”72 Thus, the
term transgender should be construed broadly to include individuals
who seek access to gender-affirming healthcare and gender nonconforming individuals who do not.
B.

Diagnosis and Treatment of Adolescent Gender Dysphoria

This section explores the medical community’s acceptance of GD
as a clinical condition that requires treatment and the development of
appropriate health protocols to treat it. In addition to recognizing the
occurrence of GD among adults, the medical community also
recognizes that children and adolescents may experience GD.
Indeed, health professionals and psychologists who have studied GD
have developed diagnostic criteria for adolescent GD and have
outlined the best methods and practices for treatment.

1.

Diagnosis of Adolescent Gender Dysphoria

The DSM-V classifies GD as “the distress that may accompany the
incongruence between one’s experienced or expressed gender and
one’s assigned gender.”73 The DSM-V has two separate diagnostic
criteria for gender dysphoria in children74 and gender dysphoria in

71. Adams, supra note 37, at 179 (noting that using a desire for gender affirming
surgery as a determinative factor for identifying an individual as transgender ignores
that individual’s dignity).
72. WPATH, supra note 23, at 5 (emphasis added).
73. DSM-V, supra note 17, at 451.
74. Id. at 452.
For children, the DSM-V requires six of the following
manifestations:
1.
A strong desire to be of the other gender or an insistence
that one is the other gender (or some alternative gender different
from one’s assigned gender).
2.
In boys (assigned gender), a strong preference for crossdressing or simulating female attire; or in girls (assigned gender), a
strong preference for wearing only typical masculine clothing and a
strong resistance to the wearing of typical feminine clothing.
3. A strong preference for cross-gender roles in make-believe play
or fantasy play.
4. A strong preference for the toys, games, or activities
stereotypically used or engaged in by the other gender.
5.
A strong preference for playmates of the other gender.
6. In boys (assigned gender), a strong rejection of typically
masculine toys, games, and activities and a strong avoidance of

86

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLIII

adolescents and adults.75 Under both criteria, diagnosis is based upon
manifestations of (1) incongruence between an individual’s gender
expression and their sex assigned at birth, and “(2) clinically
significant distress or impairment in social, school, or other important
areas of functioning.”76 For adolescents and adults, the DSM-V
requires that the incongruence be manifested by at least two of the
following:77
1. A marked incongruence between one’s
experienced/expressed gender and primary and/or
secondary sex characteristics (or in young adolescents,
the anticipated secondary sex characteristics).
2. A strong desire to be rid of one’s primary
and/or secondary sex characteristics because of a
marked
incongruence
with
one’s
experienced/expressed
gender
(or
in
young
adolescents, a desire to prevent the development of
the anticipated secondary sex characteristics).
3. A strong desire for the primary and/or
secondary sex characteristics of the other gender.
4. A strong desire to be of the other gender (or
some alternative gender different from one’s assigned
gender).
5. A strong desire to be treated as the other
gender (or some alternative gender different from
one’s assigned gender).
6. A strong conviction that one has the typical
feelings and reactions of the other gender (or some
alternative gender different form one’s assigned
gender).78
rough-and-tumble play; or in girls (assigned gender), a strong
rejection of typically feminine toys, games, and activities.
7. A strong dislike for one’s sexual anatomy.
8. A strong desire for the primary and/or secondary sex
characteristics that match one’s experienced gender.

Id.
75. Id at 452-53.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 452.
78. Id. Critics of the DSM-V’s definition have argued that the criteria emphasize
an expectation for individuals to conform with gender and heterosexual norms that
harkens back to an era in which homosexuality was pathologized. It is worth noting
that the APA first added the diagnostic criteria for GD to the DSM-V in the same
year that homosexuality was removed. Some scholars argue that these changes were
based on the then-emerging gay and lesbian rights movement, which made inclusion
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Mental health experts have also recognized treatment protocols
and standards for diagnosing and treating GD.79 One such source of
protocols and standards is WPATH, an international association of
multidisciplinary professionals with a mission towards producing
evidence-based education, advocacy, and policy surrounding
transgender health.80
The association was founded by Harry
Benjamin, whose seminal work, The Transsexual Phenomenon,
brought wide attention to transgender identities and the notion that
individuals should live according to their preferred gender.81
Benjamin eventually founded WPATH and oversaw the development
of the WPATH Standards of Care, a treatment protocol that provides
guidance to health professionals to assist transgender and gendernonconforming individuals.82 The Standards of Care, now in its
seventh edition, are used by professionals in the field of transgender
health, have been accepted by the AMA,83 and have been
acknowledged by federal courts as being generally accepted in the
medical field.84

of homosexuality in the DSM-V unacceptable, but it did not disturb the association of
gender-variant behavior with homosexuality. Mental health professionals have since
sought to acknowledge the role that varying cultural attitudes towards gender play in
defining gender identities while still understanding the occurrence of GD amongst
adolescents. See Shield, supra note 31, at 387–88; Ian Wilson et al., The Validity of
the Diagnosis of Gender Identity Disorder (Child and Adolescent Criteria), 7
CLINICAL CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 335, 339 (2002).
79. WPATH, supra note 23, at 1–2 (noting the purpose of the Standards of Care is
to offer “standards for promoting optimal care and guiding the treatment of people
experiencing gender dysphoria” and that it is based upon “the best available science
and expert professional consensus”).
80. Id.
81. Wilson et al., supra note 78, at 337–38.
82. WPATH, supra note 23, at 2.
83. AMA RESOLUTION 122, supra note 19, at 1 (“The [WPATH] is the leading
international interdisciplinary professional organization devoted to the
understanding and treatment of gender identity disorders, and [it] has established
internationally accepted Standards of Care for providing medical treatment for
people with [GD].”).
84. See, e.g., NCD 140.3, Transsexual Surgery, Docket No. 2576, at 20–23 (Dep’t
of Health & Human Serv. May 30, 2014) [hereinafter H.H.S. Medicare Decision]
(citing De’Lonta v. Johnson, 708 F.3d 520, 522–23 (4th Cir. 2013) (noting that the
SOC “are the generally accepted protocols for the treatment of [GD]”),
http://www.hhs.gov/dab/decisions/dabdecisions/dab2576.pdf [https://perma.cc/B6JXTQF5] and Glenn v. Brumby, 724 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1289 n.4 (N.D. Ga. 2010) (noting
that “there is sufficient evidence that statements of WPATH are accepted in the
medical community”)).
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Occurrence of Gender Dysphoria Among Children and
Adolescents

It is generally accepted within the medical community that children
may experience GD.85 Eminent psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg
suggests that children develop an understanding of their gender
identity between the ages of five and seven when they realize that
they will not be able to change their physiological characteristics.86
More recent studies show that the average age at which transgender
participants “felt different from others” was seven and a half years
old.87 Other studies indicate that individuals become aware of their
“gender difference” at any age before fourteen.88 Collectively, these
studies suggest that most transgender individuals are aware of their
gender nonconformity during adolescence.89
While the medical community recognizes that children may
experience GD, most professionals suggest that treatment is better
suited for adolescents.90 Both the DSM-V and the WPATH standards
note that children as young as two years old may show indications of
GD,91 but that persistence of GD into adolescence and adulthood is

85. Id. at 10; see also DSM-V, supra note 17, at 452 (providing diagnostic criteria
for GD in children).
86. BEEMYN & RANKIN, supra note 36, at 42 (citing Lawrence Kohlberg, A
Cognitive Developmental Analysis of Children’s Sex Role Concepts and Attitudes, in
THE DEVELOPMENT OF SEX DIFFERENCES 88–173 (E.E. Maccoby ed., 1966)).
87. Arnold H. Grossman et al., Parents’ Reactions to Transgender Youths’
Gender Nonconforming Expression and Identity, 18 J. GAY & LESBIAN SOC. SERVS.
3, 5 (2005) (finding that fifty-five FTM and MTF transgender youths felt “different
from others” at a mean age of 7.5).
88. BEEMYN & RANKIN, supra note 36, at 42 (discussing one study in which
respondents stated that their earliest memories of being transgender were from their
earliest memories to age fourteen, with a median age of five years old).
89. Id. at 43 (finding one study where ninety-seven percent of the 3747
respondents indicated that they “recognized themselves as being different from
others or their assigned gender by the end of the[ir] teenage years”).
90. AMA RESOLUTION 122, supra note 19; see WPATH, supra note 23, at 12
(noting that “in most children, gender dysphoria will disappear before, or early in,
puberty”); see also Bernadette Wren, Early Physical Intervention for Young People
with Atypical Gender Identity Development, 5 CLINICAL CHILD PSYCHOL. &
PSYCHIATRY 220, 222–23 (2000) (noting that “research and clinical descriptions”
make clear that adolescents experiencing GD invariably seek gender affirming
surgery later in life, while children who experience GD do so at lower levels or not at
all).
91. WPATH, supra note 23, at 12; DSM-V, supra note 17, at 455. While the
diagnostic criteria has been criticized for focusing too heavily on the child’s gender
expression as opposed to their own intrinsic sense of gender identity, such criticisms
do not question the phenomenology of gender dysphoria within children.
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not inevitable.92 The WPATH standards note, however, that some
children experiencing feelings of GD will find that these “feelings will
intensify and the body aversion will develop or increase as they
become adolescents and their secondary sex characteristics
develop.”93 While it is uncertain whether a particular child with GD
will continue to experience GD as he or she transitions into
adolescence, research indicates that an adolescent who experiences
GD is likely to continue experiencing feelings of gender dysphoria
into adulthood.94 In fact, one study found that all of its participants
who were diagnosed with adolescent GD and given pubertysuppressing hormones95 continued with gender-affirming treatment as
they transitioned into adulthood, which is strong evidence that their
feelings of GD did not disappear as they aged.96

3.

Treatment of Gender Dysphoria Among Adolescents

The WPATH Standards of Care outline proper treatment for GD
that could include psychological interventions, social interventions,
and physical interventions.97 This “triadic therapy” approach has
been embraced by psychologists.98 Psychological interventions consist
of psychotherapy that is focused on reducing the distress related to
GD.99 Social interventions consist of the individual taking on the
cultural role of the desired gender identity so that they may
appreciate the familial, interpersonal, and legal consequences of

92. DSM-V, supra note 17, at 455 (stating that persistence in natal males has
ranged from 2.2% to 30% and 12% to 50% in natal females).
93. WPATH, supra note 23, at 12.
94. Id.; Annelou L.C. de Vries et al., Puberty Suppression in Adolescents with
Gender Identity Disorder: A Prospective Follow-Up Study, 8 J. SEXUAL MED. 2276,
2281 (2010).
95. Puberty-suppressing hormones delay the onset of puberty, giving children and
adolescents who experience gender dysphoria some time to further discover their
gender identity. Kristian Foden-Vencil, Puberty Suppression Now a Choice for Teens
On Medicaid in Oregon, NPR (Apr. 3, 2015), http://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2015/04/05/397275700/puberty-suppression-now-choice-for-teens-on-medicaidin-oregon; see also Kristian Foden-Vencil, The Medical Pros and Cons of
Suppressing Puberty in Transgender Teens, OR. PUB. RADIO (Mar. 25, 2015),
http://www.opb.org/news/article/the-medical-pros-and-cons-of-suppressing-pubertyin-transgender-teens [https://perma.cc/R3E4-8T5E] [hereinafter Foden-Vencil,
Medical Pros and Cons]. The hormones have been prescribed and approved for
precocious puberty, but are now covered under Oregon’s state Medicaid program for
treatment of GD. Id.
96. Foden-Vencil, Medical Pros and Cons, supra note 95.
97. WPATH, supra note 23, at 15.
98. COHEN-KETTENIS & PFÄFFLIN , supra note 47, at 132.
99. WPATH, supra note 23, at 15.
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gender transition.100 Examples of social interventions might include
wearing clothes or a hairstyle that reflects the adolescent’s gender
identity or using a name and pronouns that are congruent with the
adolescent’s gender identity.101 Physical interventions, which the
WPATH suggests should be pursued only after an individual has
engaged in the psychological and social interventions,102 consist of
estrogen or testosterone suppressants, as well as surgical
procedures.103 The WPATH approach relies on the individual to
determine his or her own gender identity, rather than framing
treatment within a gender binary.104
C.

Medicaid Coverage of Gender-Affirming Healthcare

Medicaid is a joint federal and state program that helps individuals
with low income or low resources pay for health services and medical
treatments.105 Although states receive federal funding for Medicaid,
states’ governments establish and define the scope of their Medicaid
Because gender-affirming healthcare is costly,
programs.106
individuals seeking to transition often cannot afford to pay for
treatment on their own,107 and only a few state Medicaid programs
provide coverage for gender-affirming healthcare.108 States that do
not expressly cover gender-affirming treatments either expressly deny
Medicaid coverage of gender-affirming healthcare or deny coverage

100. Id. at 17; COHEN-KETTENIS & PFÄFFLIN, supra note 47, at 141.
101. WPATH, supra note 23, at 16.
102. WPATH’s Standards of Care have been criticized for this as it places the
mental health practitioners in a determinative role that requires greater financial
resources, and some view the WPATH standards as also placing psychology
professionals as “gatekeepers” to medically necessary care. Sebastian, Transgender
People, Transitioning, and Those Darn Standards of Care, AUTOSTRADDLE (Oct. 5,
2011, 10:12 AM), http://www.autostraddle.com/transgender-people-and-those-darnstandards-of-care-113430 [https://perma.cc/HDD8-2ZAN] (discussing the 6th edition
of the WPATH standards).
103. WPATH, supra note 23, at 18.
104. Id. at 9.
105. Medicaid,
MEDICARE.GOV,
http://www.medicare.gov/your-medicarecosts/help-paying-costs/medicaid/medicaid.html [https://perma.cc/9H4F-PHPZ].
106. Nicole M. True, Removing the Constraints to Coverage of GenderConfirming Healthcare by State Medicaid Programs, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1329, 1343–44
(2012).
107. Casazza, supra note 34, at 649–50; see also HORTON, supra note 32, at 4.
108. Casazza, supra note 34, at 642; see also Levasseur, supra note 22, at 957 (citing
Trans
Aging:
We’re
Still
Here!,
LAMBDA
LEGAL
(2016),
http://www.lambdalegal.org/sites/default/files/2016_trans-aging-fs-v6-singlewithbleed.pdf [https://perma.cc/J67G-QFYF] (noting that “most private and public
insurance companies are still behind the times”).
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on the grounds that it is not “medically necessary.”109 Some states
that do extend coverage, such as New York and Vermont, restrict it
on the basis of age.110

1.

Federal and Private Insurance Coverage of Gender-Affirming
Healthcare

Due to the high costs of gender-affirming healthcare, most
individuals who seek to transition can only do so if the treatment is
covered by private insurers or Medicaid.111 A 2001 study found that
the average cost for male-to-female gender-affirming surgery and
hormones was close to $20,000 over the course of three years.112 That
same study found that the average cost of female-to-male genderaffirming surgery and hormones was $16,512 over a three-year
period.113 More recent reports vary, with some suggesting that the
cumulative costs could be between $40,000 and $100,000.114 Genderaffirming healthcare is thus likely to be cost-prohibitive if covered by
an individual alone.

109. Casazza, supra note 34, at 642 (noting that many states “specifically prohibit
the use of funds for sex reassignment surgery,” and that federal courts have denied
coverage of medically necessary sex reassignment surgery (SRS) “in instances when
states fail to address whether SRS is covered or not”); see Rush v. Johnson, 565 F.
Supp. 856, 868 (N.D. Ga., 1983) (finding Georgia reasonably determined that
“transsexual surgery” is experimental); see also Smith v. Rasmussen, 249 F.3d 755,
760 (8th Cir., 2001) (finding that Iowa’s exclusion of “sex reassignment surgery” from
Medicaid coverage was not arbitrary and capricious).
110. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 505.2 (2016) (denying coverage
for hormone therapy and gender affirming surgery for individuals under the age of
eighteen and denying coverage for gender affirming surgery that results in
sterilization for individuals under the age of twenty-one); Gender Reassignment
Surgery, DEP’T OF VT. HEALTH ACCESS MED. POL’Y (Dep’t of Vt. Health Access,
Williston, Vt.), July 14, 2015, http://dvha.vermont.gov/for-providers/1genderreassignment-surgery071415.pdf [https://perma.cc/4BYD-JPNU] (denying coverage
for any gender-affirming healthcare to individuals under the age of twenty-one).
111. Casazza, supra note 34, at 649–50.
112. HORTON, supra note 32.
113. Id.
114. Transaction
Costs,
TRANSSEXUAL
ROAD
MAP,
http://www.tsroadmap.com/reality/finance/fintrncost.html
[https://perma.cc/2XPPBENH]. Additionally, it appears that genital surgery alone could cost around
$20,000. Female to Male Price List, PHILA. CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER SURGERY,
http://www.thetransgendercenter.com/index.php/femaletomale1/ftm-price-list.html
[https://perma.cc/XEW5-Y33J]; Male to Female Price List, PHILA. CTR. FOR
TRANSGENDER SURGERY, http://www.thetransgendercenter.com/index.php/mtf-pricelist.html [https://perma.cc/P25Q-27MR]; see Amanda Kennedy, Because We Say So:
The Unfortunate Denial of Rights to Transgender Minors Regarding Transition, 19
HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 281, 284 (2008) (citing a Transgender Law Center report
which finds that surgery may cost up to $100,000).
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These costs present significant challenges to a large proportion of
the transgender population, as many individuals cannot afford
gender-affirming healthcare. One reason for this is that transgender
individuals are disproportionately subjected to employment
discrimination and wage discrimination.115 In a 2011 study of
transgender individuals, fifteen percent of respondents reported
making $10,000 or less per year, a percentage nearly four times that of
the general population.116 Transgender youth, in particular, are also
less likely to have the means to meet the costs of gender-affirming
healthcare, as they typically are dependent on a parent for access to
healthcare coverage and because transgender youth are
overrepresented among runaway and homeless youth.117
In recent years, more employers have implemented health benefit
plans that cover some form of gender-affirming healthcare.118 State
and municipal legislatures have created incentives for insurance
companies and businesses to cover gender-affirming healthcare.119 In
New York, for instance, the Department of Financial Services issued
a circular in 2014 clarifying that a denial of gender-affirming
treatments, where that treatment is otherwise covered, would be a

115. MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, FAMILY EQUALITY COUNCIL
FOR AM. PROGRESS, ALL CHILDREN MATTER: HOW LEGAL AND
INEQUALITIES
HURT
LGBT
FAMILIES
9

& CTR.
SOCIAL
(2011),
http://action.familyequality.org/site/DocServer/AllChildrenMatterFullFinal10212011.
pdf?docID=2401 [https://perma.cc/S7QW-38RY] (citing JAIME M. GRANT ET AL.,
NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., INJUSTICE AT EVERY TURN: A REPORT OF
THE
NATIONAL
TRANSGENDER
DISCRIMINATION
SURVEY
2
(2011),
http://www.thetaskforce.org/static_html/downloads/reports/reports/ntds_full.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XAP8-XCGD]).
116. Id. at 9.
117. ANDREW CRAY ET AL., CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, SEEKING SHELTER: THE
EXPERIENCES AND UNMET NEEDS OF LGBT HOMELESS YOUTH 4, 8 (2013); LANCE
FREEMAN & DARRICK HAMILTON, EMPIRE STATE COAL. OF YOUTH & FAMILY
SERVS., A COUNT OF HOMELESS YOUTH IN NEW YORK CITY (2008).
118. HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOUND., CORPORATE EQUALITY INDEX:
INCLUSIVE HEALTH CARE COVERAGE AND THE CORPORATE EQUALITY INDEX 3
(2012) (finding a five-fold increase in the number of major U.S. employers affording
transgender-inclusive health care coverage, from forty-nine in 2009 to more than two
hundred in 2012).
119. See Insurance Circular Letter No. 7 from the New York State Dep’t of Fin.
Servs., to All Insurers Authorized to Write Accident and Health Insurance in New
York State, Article 43 Corporations, and Health Maintenance Organizations
(“HMOs”)
(collectively,
“insurers”)
(Dec.
11,
2014),
[https://perma.cc/D85Yhttp://www.dfs.ny.gov/insurance/circltr/2014/cl2014_07.pdf
32G5] (citing N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 11, § 52.16(c) (2016)) (clarifying that
a denial of medically necessary GD coverage would violate state law); Phila. City
Council 130224 (Pa. 2013) (providing tax credits to employers who expand health
benefits to cover transgender related healthcare).
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violation of state regulations prohibiting companies from limiting
coverage on the basis of illness, treatment, or medical condition.120
Market forces may also have motivated insurers to cover genderaffirming healthcare, as more employers are seeking this coverage.121
Despite evidence of the medical necessity of gender-affirming
healthcare for adults and adolescents with GD, government
subsidized health insurance varies in its coverage.122 Medicare, which
provides coverage for individuals over the age of sixty-five and is
administered solely by the federal government’s Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS), covers gender-affirming surgery
for eligible Medicare recipients.123 By contrast, Tricare, the federal
government’s healthcare program for members of the military and
Department of Defense, expressly excludes coverage for all genderaffirming healthcare.124
Medicaid coverage of gender-affirming
healthcare varies by state, as each state determines the scope of its
Medicaid program.125 Unlike Medicare and Tricare, Medicaid is

120. Insurance Circular Letter No. 7 from the New York State Dep’t of Fin. Servs.,

supra note 119 (citing (tit. 11, § 52.16(c)).
121. TRANSGENDER LAW CTR., TRANSGENDER HEALTH BENEFITS: NEGOTIATING
INCLUSIVE COVERAGE 14 (2014), http://transgenderlawcenter.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/01/Health-Insurance-Exclusions-Guide-2-WEB.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X4YB-W2BB] (advising that employees show employers how their
competitors may be gaining an advantage by offering trans-inclusive healthcare
plans).
122. DSM-V, supra note 17, at 454; see also H.H.S. Medicare Decision, supra note
84. In its decision to extend Medicare coverage to gender-affirming healthcare, the
Department of Health and Human Services found that there is “a consensus among
researchers and mainstream medical organizations that transsexual surgery is an
effective, safe, and medically necessary treatment for [gender dysphoria].” H.H.S.
Medicare Decision, supra note 84. The decision also cited new evidence which
asserted that “gender affirming surgeries . . . are the standard of care and are not
experimental.” Id.
123. See H.H.S. Medicare Decision, supra note 84, at 1 (“The Board has
determined that the National Coverage Determination (NCD) denying Medicare
coverage of all transsexual surgery as a treatment for transsexualism is not valid
under the ‘reasonableness standard’ the Board applies.”).
124. 32 C.F.R. § 199.4 (2015) (“All services and supplies directly or indirectly
related to transsexualism or such other conditions as gender dysphoria are excluded
under [Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniform Services]
[(]CHAMPUS[)].”). Note, it is odd that the federal government finds that gender
affirming surgery and hormone treatments are medically necessary when one is sixtyfive or older, but not when one is young and has served or is serving in the military.
125. Casazza, supra note 34, at 642; Transgender Health Care, HEALTHCARE.GOV,
https://www.healthcare.gov/transgender-health-care/ [https://perma.cc/6ZZP-7E2V]
(“Many health plans are still using exclusions such as ‘services related to sex change’
or ‘sex reassignment surgery’ to deny coverage to transgender people for certain
health care services. Coverage varies by state.”).
FOR
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administered jointly by the federal government and states.126 States
determine the coverage of their Medicaid programs, but only receive
federal funding if they meet federal regulations.127 Thus, states have
taken three different approaches to include or exclude genderaffirming healthcare from Medicaid coverage.

2.

Three Approaches to Medicaid Coverage of Gender-Affirming
Healthcare

In regulating the coverage of their Medicaid plans, states fall into
one of three distinct groups. First, a minority of states have
promulgated regulations that expressly exclude Medicaid coverage of
gender-affirming healthcare or gender-affirming surgery.128 The
language of these statutes varies in breadth: some arguably only limit
the exclusion to gender-affirming surgical procedures,129 while others
use broader language that clearly excludes all forms of genderaffirming healthcare.130 Second, a majority of states do not have
regulations that expressly deny coverage for gender-affirming
healthcare or gender-affirmation surgery, but nonetheless, they have
a practice of not extending coverage on the grounds that the
treatments are not “medically necessary.”131 These states have
prevailed in federal court against challenges seeking coverage, as the

126. “Medicaid offers the States a bargain: Congress provides federal funds in
exchange for the States’ agreement to spend them in accordance with congressionally
imposed conditions.” Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1382
(2015).
127. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b (2015).
128. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 256B.0625 (West 2016); MO. CODE REGS. ANN.
tit. 22, §10-2.060 (2010); 471 NEB. ADMIN. CODE § 18-003.01 (2010); 55 PA. CODE §
1163.59 (2016).
129. See, e.g., IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 441-78.1(249A) (2016) (prohibiting coverage
of “[c]osmetic, reconstructive, or plastic surgery performed in connection with certain
conditions is specifically excluded. These conditions are . . . [p]rocedures related to
transsexualism, hermaphroditism, gender identity disorders, or body dysmorphic
disorders.”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 256B.0625 (West 2016) (“Sex reassignment surgery
is not covered.”); 471 NEB. ADMIN. CODE § 18-003.0l (2010) (“[Nebraska Medical
Assistance Program] [(]NMAP[)] does not cover . . . sex change procedures); 55 PA.
CODE § 1163.59 (2016) (excluding coverage of all “[t]ranssexual surgical procedures
for gender change or reassignment).
130. MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 22, §10-2.060 (2010) (excluding “[g]ender
reassignment services and associated expenses of transformation operations,
regardless of any diagnosis of gender role disorientation or psychosexual orientation
or any treatment or studies related to gender reassignment; also, hormonal support
for gender reassignment”).
131. See Casazza, supra note 34, at 642; see, e.g., IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 44178.1(249A) (2016); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 256B.0625 (West 2016); 55 PA. CODE §
1163.59 (2016).
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Supreme Court has given states broad discretion in determining what
constitutes a medical necessity.132 Third, a growing minority of states
is adopting regulations that expressly extend Medicaid coverage for
gender-affirming healthcare.133 Among these states is New York,
which repealed its blanket exclusion of gender-affirming healthcare in
2014.134 While each state may have particular requirements for
individuals to meet in order to be eligible for coverage, the New York
regulation contains a few provisions that distinguish it from other
states.

3.

New York’s Medicaid Coverage of Gender-Affirming
Healthcare

Before 2014, New York statutorily excluded all gender-affirming
healthcare from Medicaid coverage.135 Section 505.2 of title 18 of the
New York Codes, Rules and Regulations (NYCRR) sets forth the
physicians’ services the New York State Medicaid program covers.136
When section 505.2 was promulgated in 1998, it denied coverage for
all care, services, drugs, or supplies rendered for the purpose of
gender reassignment or any care, services, drugs, or supplies intended
to promote such treatment.137 In December 2014, however, the New
York State Department of Health proposed an amendment to the
regulation that would authorize Medicaid coverage for genderaffirming healthcare.138 The amendment was the result of a twelveyear campaign139 by transgender-rights advocates that included the

132. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 444 (1977).
133. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 505.2 (2016); see also Gender
Reassignment Surgery, supra note 110; HEALTH EVIDENCE REV. COMM’N AUG. 14,
2014
MEETING
MINUTES,
at
7
(Or.
2014),
http://www.oregon.gov/oha/herc/CommitteeMeetingMaterials/HERC%20Minutes%
208-14-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/T3NJ-M2KH].
134. tit. 18, § 505.2(l).
135. Transgender Related Care and Services, 2014 N.Y. Reg. 2 (Dec. 17, 2014)
(codified at tit. 18, § 505.2(l)) (“Section 505.2(l) of 18 NYCRR, related to Medicaid
payment for physicians’ services, currently prohibits payment for any care, services,
drugs, or supplies rendered in connection with GRS.”).
136. tit. 18, § 505.2(l).
137. Transgender Related Care and Services, 2014 N.Y. Reg. 2; see N.Y. COMP.
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 505.2(l).
138. Transgender Related Care and Services, 2014 N.Y. Reg. 2.
139. In 2008, New York Legal Assistance Group, Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe,
and the Sylvia Rivera Project filed a § 1983 claim on behalf of Teri Casillas, a
transgender woman from the Bronx, that challenged New York’s Medicaid program
on the grounds that it violated the 14th Amendment. Casillas v. Daines, 580 F. Supp.
2d 235 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); see 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2015). Following the court’s decision
to uphold the regulation, the Sylvia Rivera Project lobbied the Governor’s office and
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filing of Cruz v. Zucker, a class action suit brought by the Sylvia
Rivera Project, the Legal Aid Society, and Wilkie Farr & Gallagher
LLP against the Department of Health.140 In Cruz, the two named
plaintiffs—transgender Medicaid recipients who were residents of
New York City—argued that the state’s Medicaid program violated
three requirements of the federal Medicaid Act, the New York State
Constitution, and the Affordable Care Act.141 The claim was brought
against the Commissioner of the New York State Department of
Health, Howard Zucker, and was settled with one of the named
plaintiffs shortly before the Department of Health announced it
would amend section 505.2 of the State’s Medicaid regulation.142 The
express purpose of the amended version of section 505.2 was “to
authorize Medicaid coverage for transgender related care and
services,” and indeed, the amendment explicitly extended coverage
for medically necessary hormone therapy and gender-affirming
surgery for the treatment of gender dysphoria.143

4.

New York’s Age-Based Limitations of Medicaid Coverage for
Gender-Affirming Care

While advocates lauded the proposed amendments to section
505.2, organizations like the Transgender Legal Defense and
Education Fund (TLDEF) also noted that it fell short.144 During the
notice and comment period, advocates criticized section 505.2’s agebegan media campaigning in conjunction with GLAAD. End Healthcare
Discrimination for Transgender People, GLAAD, http://www.glaad.org/healthcare
[https://perma.cc/48QH-33UH]. In June of 2014, the Sylvia Rivera Project worked
with the Legal Aid Society of New York and Wilkie, Farr & Gallagher to file Cruz v.
Zucker. Elana Redfield, Medicaid Programs Will Now Cover Transgender
Healthcare Following SLRP’s Twelve-Year Campaign, SYLVIA RIVERA L. PROJECT
(Dec. 17, 2014), http://srlp.org/medicaid-programs-will-now-cover-transgenderhealthcare-following-srlps-twelve-year-campaign [https://perma.cc/989S-B7W4].
140. Complaint at 1, Cruz v. Zucker, 116 F. Supp. 3d 334 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (No. 14
CV 4456), 2014 WL 2872300); see also Redfield, supra note 139.
141. Complaint, supra note 140, at 2.
142. Stipulation & Order, Cruz, 116 F. Supp. 3d 334 (No. 14 CV 4456).
143. Transgender Related Care and Services, 2014 N.Y. Reg. 2.
144. TLDEF’s executive director stated: “While this new regulation will
dramatically improve the lives of many transgender New Yorkers by ensuring that
they receive the medically necessary care that they need, it does not address all of the
medically necessary health care needs that transgender people have. And it
continues to exclude transgender youth. We look forward to working with the
administration in the coming weeks to remedy this.” Press Release, Transgender
Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, New York State Acts to Remove Medicaid Ban on
Transgender
Health
Care
(Dec.
16,
2014),
http://www.transgenderlegal.org/headline_show.php?id=554New
[https://perma.cc/29RJ-BBTE].
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based restriction of coverage, its referral requirements for certain
procedures, and its exclusion of “cosmetic procedures.”145 Despite
this criticism, the state nonetheless kept these provisions in place.146
New York’s procedure-based exclusion is similar to those in other
states, such as Vermont, where procedures that are categorized as
cosmetic are excluded from coverage.147 These kinds of exclusions
have been criticized for denying coverage that many medical and
psychological experts could designate as medically necessary,
including, for instance, breast augmentation or reduction
procedures.148 While New York’s Medicaid program covers the cost
of breast reduction, it excludes coverage for breast augmentation.149
All of these procedures may be merely cosmetic in other contexts;
however, they are often identified as medically necessary for
transgender individuals.150 The WPATH further notes that in the
context of gender-affirming surgeries, procedures that might typically
have little therapeutic value to someone without GD—such as a
rhinoplasty—may have a radical and permanent effect on the quality
of life for someone experiencing GD.151
New York and other states adopt a list of requirements that
transgender individuals seeking gender-affirming surgery must meet

145. Letter from Ethan Boehme Rice, Staff Att’y, Transgender Legal Def. & Educ.
Fund, to Katherine Cerolao, Bureau of House Counsel, N.Y. Dep’t of Health (Feb. 2,
2015)
[hereinafter
TLDEF
Comments],
http://www.transgenderlegal.org/media/uploads/doc_608.pdf [https://perma.cc/8RDUE5HD] (“Many of these procedures can be medically necessary for the treatment of
gender dysphoria. The Proposed Rule should be clarified to ensure that coverage is
available for all medically necessary care for the treatment of gender dysphoria.”).
146. Transgender Related Care and Services, 2015 N.Y. Reg. 13–15 (Feb. 24, 2015);
See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 505.2(l) (2016).
147. Gender Reassignment Surgery, supra note 110 (excluding coverage of facial
feminization surgery, jaw shortening/sculpting/facial bone reduction or other head or
neck reconstruction, blepharoplasty, rhinoplasty, lip reduction/enhancement,
face/forehead lift, chin/nose transplants, trachea shave/reduction thyroid
chondroplasty, laryngoplasty, electrolysis, hair removal, liposuction, collagen
injections, removal of redundant skin, hair transplantation, voice modification
surgery.).
148. TLDEF Comments, supra note 145 (“Certain procedures that are designated
‘cosmetic’ interventions can have a profound beneficial effect in treating gender
dysphoria and are medically necessary in such cases. For example, Subsection
(4)(v)(b) excludes coverage for ‘breast augmentation.’ However, the [WPATH]
Standards of Care include breast augmentation (implants, lipofilling) as medically
necessary treatment for some patients with gender dysphoria.”).
149. Mastectomies or breast reduction surgery is absent from the list of excluded
procedures. tit. 18, § 505.2(l).
150. WPATH, supra note 23, at 58.
151. Id. at 58.
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to be reimbursed for gender-affirming surgery.152 Specifically, a
patient must: (1) have referrals from two independent physicians, (2)
have “a well-documented case of gender dysphoria,” (3) have taken
hormones for a minimum of twelve months, (4) have lived in the
congruent gender role for at least twelve months and received
medically necessary health counseling during that time,153 (5) have
“no other . . . medical . . . conditions that would be a contraindication
of gender-affirmation surgery”, and (6) have “the capacity to make a
fully informed decision and to consent to the treatment.”154 Thus, the
regulation requires that an individual provide evidence that genderaffirming surgery is a medical necessity.
The most problematic requirement imposed by section 505.2 is its
limitation of coverage for hormone therapy and gender-affirming
surgery on the basis of age.155 Section 505.2 limits coverage for
gender-affirming surgery that results in sterilization to patients who
are twenty-one or older.156 Further, the regulation limits coverage for
hormone therapy and gender-affirming surgery that does not result in
sterilization to patients who are eighteen or older.157 At least one
other state, Vermont, has implemented a similar age restriction in
their Medicaid program that excludes coverage for individuals under
the age of twenty-one.158 New York diverges from a number of states
in this regard, as many states have extended Medicaid coverage
without age-based restrictions.159 In Oregon, for example, treatment

152. tit. 18, § 505.2(l).
153. This requirement bears similarities to the WPATH Standards of Care that
recommend mental health professionals help clients and their families decide about
the timing and extent to which adolescents express a gender role that is consistent
with their gender identity. WPATH, supra note 23, at 21. For example, a mental
health professional should help a client decide when they might wear clothing or a
hairstyle that reflects their gender identity or when to adopt a name and pronouns
that reflects their gender identity. Id.
154. tit. 18, § 505.2(a).
155. Transgender Related Care and Services, 2015 N.Y. Reg. 13–15 (Feb. 24, 2015)
(“The majority of commenters objected to the proposed regulation restricting
coverage to individuals 18 years of age or older. Specifically, commenters
recommended that Medicaid cover pubertal suppressants and cross-sex hormone
therapy for children and adolescents under the age of 18.”); See tit. 18, § 505.2(l).
156. tit. 18, § 505.2(l) (“Hormone therapy . . . may be covered for individuals 18
years of age or older. Gender reassignment surgery may be covered for an individual
who is 18 years of age or older, or 21 years of age or older if the surgery will result in
sterilization.”).
157. Id.
158. Gender Reassignment Surgery, supra note 110 (“The services will only be
considered for individuals who are active Vermont Medicaid beneficiaries, age 21 or
older.”).
159. OR. ADMIN. R. 410-141-0480 (2016).
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for gender dysphoria—psychotherapy, hormone treatment, and
gender-affirming surgery—is covered for all eligible patients,
regardless of age.160
As advocates have begun to disrupt the gender binary and
traditional notions of gender identity, states have struggled to
reconcile this development with their Medicaid programs. Genderaffirming healthcare seeks to address GD, the anxiety that results
from a discrepancy between one’s gender identity and assigned sex at
birth.161 States differ in their Medicaid coverage of gender-affirming
healthcare to the extent to which they recognize it as medically
necessary.162 New York’s Medicaid program recognizes the medical
necessity of gender-affirming healthcare for adults, but does not do so
for trans youth.163 Putting aside whether this varied coverage reflects
the state’s reluctance to acknowledge trans youth and notions of
gender nonconformity generally, the age-based restrictions in section
505.2 may be at odds with the public health, legal, and policy goals of
the state.164
II. CONFLICTS IN DOCTRINE AND LAW THAT MAY
ARISE FROM MEDICAID AGE RESTRICTIONS ON
GENDER-AFFIRMING HEALTHCARE
Age-based restrictions on Medicaid coverage for gender-affirming
treatment find support and criticism from a number of sources. This
Part discusses the areas of dispute that provide support and
opposition to section 505.2 of New York’s Medicaid program.
Section II.A describes the debate within the medical community as to
whether gender-affirming treatment is medically necessary for
individuals under the age of eighteen and the difficulties that the
medical community has faced in determining how to treat GD during
adolescence. Section II.B describes how the doctrine of informed
consent might support age-based restrictions on Medicaid coverage
for gender-affirming treatment on the grounds that it presumes

160. Oregon’s medical assistance program regulation provides coverage for
treatments included on the prioritized list of services provided by the State’s Health
Evidence Review Commission (HERC). See id. In August 2014, HERC approved
hormone treatment and sex reassignment surgery for the prioritized list of services
without any age restrictions. OR. HEALTH AUTH., PRIORITIZED LIST: GUIDELINE FOR
GENDER DYSPHORIA (2015), http://www.oregon.gov/oha/herc/FactSheet/Genderdysphoria.pdf [https://perma.cc/236F-NN2R].
161. See discussion supra Section I.A.
162. See discussion supra Section I.C.
163. Id.
164. See infra Parts II, III.
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adolescents do not have the capacity to make informed decisions
about their health. In contrast, Section II.B also examines how the
statutory definitions and exceptions to the doctrine of informed
consent allow for minors to make informed health decisions and,
therefore, undermine a bright-line age-restriction. Section II.C
examines the different legal claims that may result from the age-based
restrictions and whether they justify removing the age-based
restriction on coverage.
A. The Medical Community’s View as to the Medical Necessity
of Gender-Affirming Treatment for Individuals Under the Age of
Eighteen
Dispute amongst the medical community regarding the diagnosis of
childhood GD may support the implementation of an age-based
restriction on Medicaid coverage of gender-affirming treatment.
While the DSM-V, WPATH, and APA recognize that it is possible
for children to experience GD, research suggests that treating
children under the age of twelve for GD may be unnecessary.165 The
WPATH Standards of Care note that some children may stop
experiencing GD when they begin puberty and do not affirmatively
recommend physical interventions for children.166 The APA also
notes that it is not possible to differentiate between children who will
cease to experience GD from those in whom GD will persist into
adolescence and adulthood.167 Further complicating the treatment of
GD during childhood is the lack of randomized controlled studies
which might otherwise allow for a clear consensus to develop on the
best methods of treating children who are experiencing GD.168 Thus,
165. The DSM-V recognizes the occurrence of GD amongst children and
adolescents and specifically provides diagnostic criteria for assessing GD in children.
DSM-V, supra note 17, at 452. WPATH notes that “[c]hildren as young as two may
show features that could indicate gender dysphoria.” WPATH, supra note 23, at 12;
see also AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, REPORT OF THE APA TASK FORCE ON
TREATMENT OF GENDER IDENTITY DISORDER (2011) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE
APA TASK FORCE ON TREATMENT OF GENDER IDENTITY DISORDER].
166. WPATH, supra note 23, at 12; see also Peggy Cohen-Kettenis et al., Sex
Reassignment of Adolescent Transsexuals: A Follow Up Study, 36 J. AM. ACAD.
CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 263, 263 (1997) (“Prospective studies have
shown that children with gender identity disorder will not grow up to be transsexuals.
In a few, however, the cross-gender feelings will remain. These individuals become
adolescents who will attend gender identity clinics to obtain sex reassignment surgery
(SRS).”).
167. See REPORT OF THE APA TASK FORCE ON TREATMENT OF GENDER IDENTITY
DISORDER, supra note 165, at 4.
168. Id. The APA has identified two general approaches to treating GD during
childhood: one which encourages a child to explore their expressed gender identity,
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proponents of the age-based restriction may argue that there is little
support for providing Medicaid coverage for gender-affirming
treatment for individuals under the age of twelve.
Treating GD during adolescence also presents concerns that may
support the implementation of an age-based restriction. Adolescents
may have concurring mental health conditions that may make it more
difficult for a mental health expert to assess them.169 In addition,
adolescents can become intensely focused on their immediate desires,
which may make it difficult to assess whether they are cognitively and
emotionally capable of making the decision to pursue genderaffirming treatment.170 As a result of these concerns, some health
professionals are also reluctant to treat adolescent GD on the
grounds that it may motivate an adolescent to seek unnecessary
treatment.171
Despite these concerns regarding the diagnosis and treatment of
adolescent and childhood GD, the weight of support within the
medical community supports gender-affirming treatment for
adolescents who need it.172 The DSM-V has recognized the unique
challenges in diagnosing childhood GD by adopting a separate

and another which encourages a child to adopt their assigned gender role and sex
identity at birth. Id. at 17. The latter is based on a view that it may be less desirable
for a child to adopt a non-conforming gender identity because of the social stigma
that is often attached to transgender and gender non-conforming individuals. Id.
There is, however, growing public support for the former method. See generally Kate
Snow, Congressman’s Transgender Granddaughter Makes Him Proud, MSNBC
(Oct. 10, 2015, 8:17 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/congressman-mike-hondatransgender-granddaughter-makes-him-proud [https://perma.cc/PT5V-RRCN].
169. See AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, GUIDELINES FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL PRACTICE
WITH TRANSGENDER AND GENDER NONCONFORMING PEOPLE 17 (2015),
http://www.apa.org/practice/guidelines/transgender.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CJC2QTQP] [hereinafter GUIDELINES FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL PRACTICE WITH
TRANSGENDER AND GENDER NONCONFORMING PEOPLE] (“Complicating their
clinical presentation, many gender-questioning adolescents also present with cooccurring psychological concerns, such as suicidal ideation, self-injurious behaviors,
drug and alcohol use, and autism spectrum disorders.”).
170. Id.
171. Cohen-Kettenis et al., supra note 166, at 263 (“Professionals fear that
experimenting with certain aspects of gender, such as gender role behavior, will lead
adolescents to conclude that they have a gender identity problem and that they will as
a result wrongly seek medical means of resolving their confusion.”).
172. See GUIDELINES FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL PRACTICE WITH TRANSGENDER AND
GENDER NONCONFORMING PEOPLE, supra note 169, at 17 (noting “there is greater
consensus that treatment approaches for adolescents affirm an adolescent’s gender
identity”).
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diagnostic criteria for childhood GD.173 The DSM-V diagnostic
criteria of adolescent GD, however, is the same as the criteria for
adult GD.174 In regard to treatment, the WPATH Standards of Care,
which have been supported and accepted widely by mental health
experts, includes separate treatment protocols for adolescent and
childhood GD.175 Thus, there is support from the DSM-V and
WPATH Standards to suggest that the diagnosis and treatment of
adolescent GD may bear fewer concerns than treatment of childhood
GD.
The support for treating adolescent GD is based on studies that
indicate that adolescents who experience GD throughout childhood
are likely to experience those feelings into adulthood.176 Thus, unlike
children, most adolescents will continue to experience GD without
intervention.177 Additionally, adolescents beyond the age of twelve
are more likely to have a firmer understanding of gender constancy,178
and thus are more likely to experience persistent GD.179 The growing
consensus surrounding treatment of GD during adolescence is also
reflected in empirical research that shows an increasing number of
adolescents are seeking treatment for gender dysphoria and are living
in their desired gender role upon entering high school.180 Mental
health experts thus note the need to address GD earlier and,

173. The DSM-V recognizes the occurrence of GD amongst children and
adolescents and specifically provides diagnostic criteria for assessing GD in children.
DSM-V, supra note 17, at 452.
174. Id.
175. The WPATH Standards of Care have been generally accepted by the medical
community and assert the medical necessity of gender-affirming healthcare for
adolescents. See H.H.S. Medicare Decision, supra note 84, at 22–23 (noting the
acceptance of the WPATH Standards of Care); see also WPATH, supra note 23, at
10.
176. GUIDELINES FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL PRACTICE WITH TRANSGENDER AND
GENDER NONCONFORMING PEOPLE, supra note 169, at 175.
177. de Vries et al., supra note 94, at 2276 (2011) (“Gender dysphoria will remit in
most prepubertal children with [GD] but not in most gender dysphoric
adolescents.”).
178. Gender constancy is a term used in the field of cognitive development that
refers to a child’s cognitive understanding that gender is an invariant part of the self.
Before developing the capacity for concrete operational thought, children often
conflate gender identity with surface expressions of gender identity. Gender
constancy is reached when the child has the capacity to self-label themselves as a
particular gender with the understanding that engaging in certain activities (e.g.
wearing boys’ clothes) will not change it. Kenneth Zucker et al., A Developmental,

Biopsychosocial Model for the Treatment of Children with Gender Identity
Disorder, 59 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 369, 377 (2012).
179. Id.
180. Id.
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specifically, the negative impact of delaying treatment until the
individuals reach the age of eighteen or twenty-one.181
One method of treatment which may work to dispel the criticism of
treating GD during adolescence is the use of puberty suppressants.
The suppressants, which suspend the development of unwanted
secondary sex characteristics, may be a viable option for adolescents
who are experiencing GD.182 The Endocrine Society has also
developed guidelines for the use of these suppressants that allow
patients to decide, after several years of treatment, whether to pursue
further gender-affirming treatment or to develop the secondary sex
characteristics of their assigned sex at birth.183 A 2010 follow-up study
of seventy adolescents who began taking puberty suppressants
between the ages of twelve and sixteen found that all participants
continued to pursue gender-affirming treatment into adulthood and
demonstrated a significant decrease in depression and emotional
problems.184 More recently in 2014, a follow-up study of adolescents
who began taking puberty suppressants found that those adolescents
were generally satisfied with the results and had greater psychological
functioning as a result.185 Thus, medical research may also support
extending Medicaid coverage to gender-affirming treatments such as
puberty suppressants to individuals under the age of eighteen.
181. de Vries et al., supra note 94, at 2277 (“However, as secondary sex
characteristics develop before the age of 16, waiting for medical interventions is
highly upsetting for most younger adolescents.”); see also Cohen-Kettenis et al.,
supra note 166, at 263 (“Despite the early onset of the disorder, in most countries it is
common practice not to start the actual SRS procedure earlier than 18 or even 21
years of age.”); Yolanda L.S. Smith et al., Adolescents with Gender Identity Disorder

Who Were Accepted or Rejected for Sex Reassignment Surgery: A Prospective
Follow-Up Study, 40 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 472, 472 (2001)
(“Despite the early onset of gender identity disorder (GID) in many transsexuals,
and in spite of the fact that transsexuals apply for sex reassignment surgery (SRS) at
increasingly younger ages, it is common practice not to start the actual sex
reassignment (SR) procedure before the age of 18 or 21 years.”).
182. See GUIDELINES FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL PRACTICE WITH TRANSGENDER AND
GENDER NONCONFORMING PEOPLE, supra note 169, at 17; see also REPORT OF THE
APA TASK FORCE ON TREATMENT OF GENDER IDENTITY DISORDER, supra note 165,
at 6.
183. See REPORT OF THE APA TASK FORCE ON TREATMENT OF GENDER IDENTITY
DISORDER, supra note 165, at 6.
184. de Vries et al., supra note 94, at 2276–77 (“Previous studies on the
effectiveness of [gender affirming treatment], starting at with cross-sex hormone
(CSH) treatment between the ages of 16 and 18, showed that the gender dysphoria
had dissipated, 1 year or more after GR surgery and that psychological and social
functioning of these young transsexuals was favorable.”).
185. See generally Annelou L.C. de Vries et al., Young Adult Psychological
Outcome After Puberty Suppression and Gender Reassignment, 134 PEDIATRICS 6,
11–12 (2014).

104

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLIII

B. Age Restrictions on the Access to Gender-Affirming
Healthcare May be Inconsistent with Principles of Informed
Consent
Conflicting rationales for and against an age-based restriction on
Medicaid coverage for gender-affirming treatment may also be based
on the doctrine of informed consent. The doctrine of informed
consent presumes that minors do not have the capacity to fully
understand health decisions and, thus, cannot give informed consent
to treatment.186 The doctrine may provide support for the age-based
restrictions in section 505.2 on the grounds that adolescents would not
be able to provide consent to undergo gender-affirming treatment.
On the other hand, statutory definitions and exceptions to the
doctrine of informed consent may suggest that a bright-line age
restriction to coverage is inappropriate.

1.

Support for the Age-Based Restriction as a Mechanism to
Enforce the Doctrine of Informed Consent

The doctrine of informed consent generally limits the kinds of
decisions minors can make without parental consent on the grounds
that children and adolescents do not have the capacity to make fully
informed decisions.187 The Supreme Court has consistently upheld
the doctrine and distinguished adolescents from fully formed adults
who have a greater capacity to make decisions.188 In Roper v.
Simmons, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment forbids the
imposition of the death penalty on offenders who are under the age of
eighteen at the time of the offense.189 The Court reasoned that the
death penalty is an unnecessary and inappropriate punishment for
adolescent offenders because adolescents are more likely than adults
to engage in reckless behavior and are not likely to consider the
consequences of their actions.190 Justice Kennedy noted that research
confirms “a lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of
responsibility are found in youth more often than in adults . . . .
These qualities often result in impetuous and ill-considered actions

186. Shield, supra note 31, at 393 (citing Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984)
(“Children, by definition, are not assumed to have the capacity to take care of
themselves. They are assumed to be subject to the control of their parents, and if
parental control falters, the State must play its part as parens patriae.”)).
187. Id. at 393–94.
188. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571–73 (2005); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S.
622, 633, 635 & n.13 (1979).
189. Roper, 545 U.S. at 578.
190. Id. at 569–72.
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and decisions.”191 Kennedy thus reasoned that the law should treat
youth differently than adults because of a discrepancy in decisionmaking capability.192
The Court has similarly considered the limited decision-making
capabilities of adolescents in the context of health decisions.193 In
Bellotti v. Baird, the Court heard a challenge to a Massachusetts
statute that required minors to obtain parental consent or
authorization from a court before undergoing abortions.194 While the
Court acknowledged the constitutional right of a pregnant minor to
choose to terminate her pregnancy, it ultimately held that the
vulnerability of children, their inability to make important decisions,
and the state’s interest in protecting the parental role in child rearing
justified limiting the scope of a child’s constitutional rights.195 Writing
for the majority, Justice Powell concluded that because “immature
minors often lack the ability to make fully informed choices that take
into account both the immediate and long-range consequences,”196
states may validly “limit the freedom of children to choose for
themselves in the making of important, affirmative choices with
potentially serious consequences.”197 The Court thus balanced the
doctrine of informed consent with an adolescent’s right to choose to
terminate a pregnancy by upholding the Massachusetts requirement
for parental consent on the condition that the state also allows
adolescents to bypass the requirement when a court finds that the
minor is mature enough to make a fully informed decision and that
the decision is in her best interests.198
The Court’s decisions in Bellotti and Roper may provide support
for the age-based restriction in section 505.2. The reasoning in Roper
adopted the view of adolescents as being susceptible to reckless

191. Id. at 569.
192. Shield, supra note 31, at 405.
193. See, e.g., Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 639 (hearing a challenge regarding a state statute
which required that adolescents receive parental consent prior to obtaining an
abortion).
194. Id. at 625 (ruling on the constitutionality of Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 112, §
12S (West Supp. 1979), which provided in relevant part: “If the mother is less than
eighteen years of age and has not married, the consent of both the mother and her
parents [to an abortion to be performed on the mother] is required. If one or both of
the mother’s parents refuse such consent, consent may be obtained by order of a
judge of the superior court for good cause shown, after such hearing as he deems
necessary.”)
195. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 633.
196. Id. at 640.
197. Id. at 635.
198. Id. at 643–44.
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decisions that are not made with due consideration.199 Likewise, the
Court in Bellotti held that states are justified in protecting
adolescents from poor decisions, even if that health decision is
constitutionally protected.200 Thus, the age-based restriction on
Medicaid coverage may work to protect adolescents from deciding
they need gender-affirming treatment when they are less likely to
fully consider the consequences of this decision.

2.

Age-Based Restrictions May Conflict with Exceptions to the
Doctrine of Informed Consent

While the doctrine of informed consent may support age-based
restrictions on gender-affirming treatment, the statutory definitions of
informed consent suggest that a blanket age-restriction is
inappropriate. Although most states set the age of informed consent
at eighteen, statutory definitions also generally focus on the capacity
of the individual to make decisions about his or her health.201 For
instance, in New York, informed consent “means that the patient has
to demonstrate the intellect to understand what is being proposed, to
realize and assess the risks and benefits, and to voluntarily consent to
or refuse the proposed major medical treatment.”202 On this basis,
some states, such as Oregon, have set the age of consent below the
age of eighteen, which authorizes adolescents to give informed
consent when they are fifteen.203 Thus, the age-based restriction of
section 505.2 may conflict with the doctrine of informed consent as it
focuses solely on the age of the individual and not his or her actual
ability to make informed decisions.

199. Roper, 545 U.S. at 569; Alicia Ouellette, Body Modification and Adolescent
Decision Making: Proceed with Caution, 15 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 129, 138–39
(2012) (discussing the Roper decision and its application to parental consent to body
modification).
200. Shield, supra note 31, at 394.
201. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14, § 710.1 (2016).
202. Id.
203. OR. REV. STAT. § 109.640(2) (2013) (“A minor 15 years of age or older may
give consent to, without the consent of a parent or guardian of the minor
to . . . [h]ospital care, medical or surgical diagnosis or treatment by a physician
licensed by the Oregon Medical Board.”); see also 23 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.6-1
(2012) (“Any person of the age of sixteen or over or married may consent to routine
emergency medical or surgical care.”); ALA. CODE § 22-8-4 (2010) (“Any minor who
is 14 years of age or older, or has graduated from high school, or is married, or having
been married is divorced or is pregnant may give effective consent to any legally
authorized medical, dental, health or mental health services for himself or herself,
and the consent of no other person shall be necessary.”).
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Research shows that by the time they reach sixteen, adolescents
have the same cognitive capacity as adults to make decisions about
medical treatment.204 Adolescents who are sixteen have essentially
the same cognitive abilities as adults to process and understand
information and to appreciate the nature of a given situation.205 The
risk-taking behavior and “impetuous and ill-considered actions” of
adolescents that the Court noted in Roper is generally not attributed
to limited cognitive development but rather to emotionally charged or
high-pressure situations that require adolescents to control
impulses.206 Most scholars agree that health decisions are devoid of
the same stressors that compromise adolescent decision-making in
other contexts.207 To this point, three studies examining the decision
making process of adolescents who are deciding whether to undergo
an abortion found that adolescents conceptualized and considered
treatment in the same manner as adults.208
Most states have also carved out exceptions in their informed
consent statutes, recognizing that certain adolescents may be able to
provide informed consent despite being minors.209 These exceptions
may be divided into two categories: statutes that permit minors to
give informed consent when they hold a certain status and statutes

204. Oullette, supra note 199, at 144 (“Consistently research on the development
of adolescent decision making, judgment, and brain development supports the
capacity of adolescents in medical decision making, when the criteria for measuring
decisional capacity in adults are applied.”); see also Vivian E. Hamilton, Immature
Citizens and the State, 2010 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1055, 1109 (2010).
205. Hamilton, supra note 204, at 1109; see also Andrew Newman, Adolescent
Consent to Routine Medical and Surgical Treatment, 22 J. LEGAL MED. 501, 528
(2001) (“There seems to be agreement that somewhere around the age of 15 of 16,
persons acquire sufficient decisional capacity to make reasoned decisions.”).
206. Newman, supra note 205, at 528.
207. Ouellette, supra note 199, at 146 (“Most scholars argue that the deficiencies
(impulsiveness, excessive risk-taking, susceptibility to peer pressure) are not relevant
in the healthcare context to the same degree they are in the juvenile justice
context.”).
208. Shield, supra note 31, at 403 (citing Bruce Ambuel, Developmental Trends in
Adolescents’ Psychological and Legal Competence to Consent to Abortion, 16 L. &
HUM. BEHAV. 129 (1992); Catherine C. Lewis, A Comparison of Minors’ and Adults’
Pregnancy Decisions, 50 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 446 (1980)) (finding that
“adolescents could conceptualize and reason about treatment possibilities as capably
as adults.”).
209. Newman, supra note 205, at 504 (“There are exceptions to the standard rule
that, until one reaches majority, one cannot lawfully make a final decision as to
medical treatment. Two exceptions that are generally recognized are the emergency
exception and ‘the emancipated minor’ exception.”).
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that allow minors to give informed consent when they are seeking a
particular kind of procedure.210
The status-based exceptions allow a minor to give informed
consent when they are emancipated, married, have children, are in
the military, or are deemed to be a “mature minor” by a court.211 For
instance, New York provides that minors who are married or have
given birth may give consent for their own health and the health of
their children.212 The mature minor exception requires a court to
assess whether a minor’s decision-making capacity is that of an
adult.213
Courts have recognized the validity of a mature minor adjudication
in the context of a right to refuse treatment.214 In In re E.G., the
Supreme Court of Illinois held that a seventeen-year-old girl with
leukemia, who would not consent to a medically necessary blood
transfusion because she was a Jehovah’s Witness, had a right to refuse
such treatment.215 The court noted that while the age of consent was
eighteen in Illinois, a minor is entitled to exercise a right to refuse
treatment if there is clear and convincing evidence she is “mature
enough to exercise the judgment of an adult.”216 The court also noted
that the state’s status and procedure-based exceptions to informed

210. Shield, supra note 31, at 398.
211. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2504(1),(2) (McKinney 2012); Shield, supra note 31,
at 419 (citing other states: GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9-2(a)(3) (2006); MD. CODE ANN.,
HEALTH-GEN. § 20-102 (West 2016); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-22-103 (West
2016); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-5-330 (2015); 35 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §
10101 (West 2015)).
212. See Shield, supra note 31, at 419.
213. Id. at 399; Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 644 (1979) (“We therefore conclude
that if the State decides to require a pregnant minor to obtain one or both parents’
consent to an abortion, it also must provide an alternative procedure whereby
authorization for the abortion can be obtained.”).
214. Martin T. Harvey, Adolescent Competency and the Refusal of Medical
Treatment, 13 HEALTH MATRIX 297, 301–08 (2003) (explaining a minor may be
granted informed consent if she can “prove competency by evidencing her capacity to
provide a thorough understanding of the consequences of her proposed decision to
terminate treatment along with well articulated reasons as to why her decision ought
to be respected”); see In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322, 327–28 (Ill. Sup. Ct. 1989); In re
Rena, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 335, 337–38 (1999) (finding lower court erred in not making
a determination as to a seventeen-year-old girl’s maturity); but see, In re Long Island
Jewish Medical Center, 17 Misc.2d 724, 730 (Sup. Ct. of Westchester 1990) (“While
this Court believes there is much merit to the ‘mature minor’ doctrine, I find that
[petitioner] is not a mature minor.”).
215. In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d at 323–25.
216. Id. at 328.
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consent indicate that the legislature did not intend for a bright line
age-based barrier to informed consent.217
The procedure-based exceptions allow minors to give informed
consent for certain procedures.218 Following the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Carey v. International Population Services,219 a number of
states permit minors to give informed consent to obtain
contraceptives or abortions without parental consent.220 New York
also allows minors to give informed consent for procedures that are
not constitutionally protected, such as prenatal care, substance abuse
treatment, and certain outpatient mental health services.221
Thus, statutory definitions and exceptions to the doctrine of
informed consent may provide support for removing the age-based
restrictions in section 505.2.
Definitions of informed consent
generally focus on the decision-making capacity of individuals.222
Despite being more prone to emotionally charged situations,
adolescents have been shown to have the same decision-making
capacity as adults and may exercise the same or similar judgment as
adults when making healthcare related decisions.223 Furthermore,
states appear to have recognized that, in some health contexts,
adolescents have the capacity to give informed consent.224 Although
the doctrine of informed consent presumes minors are incapable of
making informed decisions, the definitions and exceptions to the
doctrine also suggest that adolescents may have the capacity to make

217. Id. at 325–26 (citing the state’s status-based exception and procedure-based
exceptions and finding that the “two acts, when read together in a complementary
fashion, indicate that the legislature did not intend that there be an absolute 18–year–
old age barrier prohibiting minors from consenting to medical treatment.”).
218. See Shield, supra note 31, at 399.
219. Carey v. Population Serv. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 695–96 (1977).
220. Shield, supra note 31, at 399 (explaining the Supreme Court’s holding in Carey
v. Population Services International, which indicated that states cannot ban minors
from obtaining contraception, and that states have extended this ruling to allow
minors to access contraceptives without parental consent); see, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 6925 (West 1996) (allowing minors to consent to an abortion without parental
consent).
221. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH § 2504 (McKinney 2012) (allowing pregnant minors to
consent prenatal care); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 22.11(c) (McKinney 2016)
(allowing minors to consent to substance abuse treatment); see also N.Y. MENTAL
HYG. LAW § 33.21 (McKinney 2016) (providing for medical practitioners to provide
outpatient mental health treatment to minors where the minor voluntarily seeks
services, and their parents are unavailable or have refused to consent to the health
treatment which the practitioner determines is medically necessary).
222. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14, § 710.1 (2016).
223. Newman, supra note 205, at 528; Ouellette, supra note 199, at 146.
224. Shield, supra note 31, at 398.
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informed health decisions such as undergoing gender-affirming
treatment.
C.

Age Restrictions May Give Rise to Legal Claims

As noted above, the medical community’s current view of treating
GD and the doctrine of informed consent provides rationales that
support and oppose the age-based restrictions for Medicaid coverage
of gender-affirming treatment.225
Additionally, there may be
conflicting views as to whether age-based restrictions on Medicaid
coverage for gender-affirming treatment will give rise to valid legal
claims or the withholding of federal Medicaid funds, which would
justify removing the restrictions. State programs, such as New York’s,
that deny coverage of gender-affirming treatment on the basis of age
may be susceptible to legal claims brought by individuals under the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), which prohibits
programs from discriminating on the basis of gender identity.226
Likewise, states that restrict Medicaid coverage of gender-affirming
treatment on the basis of age may be subject to HHS enforcement
actions on the grounds that such restrictions violate 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396
et seq., otherwise known as the Medicaid Act.227

1.

Age-Based Restrictions Could Give Rise to Claims Under the
Affordable Care Act

A Medicaid regulation that imposes age restrictions on hormone
therapy and gender affirming surgery could give rise to legal claims
brought under the Affordable Care Act. Since its passage in 2010, the
ACA has been described as the biggest overhaul of the U.S.
healthcare system since the authorization of Medicaid and Medicare
in 1965.228 The Act implemented a number of reforms that were
intended to improve the quality of and access to healthcare, while

225. See discussion supra Sections II.A, II.B.
226. See 42 U.S.C. § 18116 (2012).
227. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396(c) (2012).
228. 70C AM. JUR. 2D Social Security and Medicare § 1905 (2016), (“The
contemplated changes to the U.S. healthcare system, resulting from the Act, have
been described as being ‘on a scale not seen since the enactment of Medicare in
1965.’”); James Vicini et al., Top Court Upholds Healthcare Law in Obama Triumph,
REUTERS (Jun. 28, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-healthcare-courtidUSBRE85R06420120628 [https://perma.cc/ZAP7-EBVL] (“The healthcare law,
known formally as the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, is the biggest
overhaul of the $2.6 trillion healthcare system in about 50 years.”).
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also lowering the costs of healthcare.229 Pursuant to its goal of
increasing access to affordable healthcare, the ACA prohibits
insurance providers and state Medicaid programs from discriminating
on the basis of race, sex, age, or disability.230
It is unclear whether challenges to the age-based restrictions in
section 505.2 would succeed. First, while HHS has implied that
disparate coverage for transgender individuals amounts to sex
discrimination,231 federal courts have yet to recognize transgender
identity as a protected status.232
The ACA’s prohibition on sex discrimination draws its authority
from Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972.233 Title IX
prohibits programs that receive federal financial assistance from
denying benefits on the basis of sex.234 Although the ACA does not
explicitly prohibit discrimination on the basis of gender identity, the
Director of the HHS Office for Civil Rights, the body that enforces
the anti-discrimination provisions of the ACA, issued a letter to
trans-rights advocates clarifying HHS’s view that the ACA antidiscrimination provision extends to discrimination on the basis of

229. See generally Key Features of the Affordable Care Act by Year, U.S. DEP’T
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/healthcare/facts-and-features/keyfeatures-of-aca-by-year/index.html# [https://perma.cc/BG4T-8SW6] (last updated
Aug. 13, 2015).
230. See 42 U.S.C. § 18116 (2012).
231. See Letter from Leon Rodriguez, Dir. of Office for Civil Rights, Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs., to Maya Rupert, Fed. Policy Dir., Nat’l Ctr. for Lesbian
Rights (July 12, 2012), https://www.nachc.com/client/OCRLetterJuly2012.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F3CB-8VYN]; see also Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and
Activities, 80 Fed. Reg. 54,172 (proposed Sept. 8, 2015) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R.
pt. 92).
232. Johnston v. Univ. of Pittsburgh of Commonwealth Sys. of Higher Educ., 97 F.
Supp. 3d 657, 674 (W.D. Pa. 2015).
233. 42 U.S.C. § 18116 (2012) (“Except as otherwise provided for in this title . . . an
individual shall not, on the ground prohibited under title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.), title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (20
U.S.C. 1681 et seq.), the Age Discrimination Act of 1975 (42 U.S.C. 6101 et seq.), or
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 794), be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under,
any health program or activity, any part of which is receiving Federal financial
assistance, including credits, subsidies, or contracts of insurance, or under any
program or activity that is administered by an Executive Agency or any entity
established under this title (or amendments). The enforcement mechanisms provided
for and available under such title VI, title IX, section 504, or such Age Discrimination
Act shall apply for purposes of violations of this subsection.”).
234. 20 U.S.C. §1681(a) (2012) (“No person in the United States shall, on the basis
of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance.”).
OF
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gender identity and sex stereotypes.235 Moreover, HHS has also
proposed using its rule to implement the anti-discrimination provision
of the ACA, which defines sex stereotypes as including “expectations
that gender can only be constructed within two distinct opposite and
disconnected forms (masculinity and femininity), and that gender
cannot be constructed outside of this gender construct (individuals
who identify as neither, both, or a combination of male and
female).”236
The proposed regulation contains provisions that
specifically address discrimination against transgender individuals in
health insurance and Medicaid coverage.237 Under these provisions,
an explicit, categorical exclusion of coverage for all health services
related to gender affirmation would be unlawful sex discrimination.238
Likewise, the proposed rule elaborates that limiting coverage or
denying coverage of a specific claim on the basis of gender identity
might also be prohibited under the ACA.239 Individuals might thus
seek to bring claims against the state on these grounds.
Individual Medicaid recipients would also have a private cause of
action to challenge a state’s Medicaid program under Title IX.240 The
ACA expressly adopts the enforcement mechanisms of Title IX to
prohibit a denial of benefits on the basis of sex,241 and the United
States Supreme Court has read an implied right of action into Title
IX.242 In Cannon v. University of Chicago, the Court held that while
it is better for Congress to specify when a statute provides a right of
action, its failure to do so is not dispositive.243 Examining Title IX, the
Court used a four-factor test to find that the statute was intended to
include a private right of action.244 Additionally, the Court noted that
235. See Letter from Leon Rodriguez, supra note 231.
236. Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 80 Fed. Reg. at 54,172.
237. Id. at 69 (“Paragraphs (b)(3) through (5) of the proposed rule specifically
address discrimination faced by transgender individuals in accessing coverage of
health services.”).
238. Id. at 72–73 (“Based on these principles, an explicit, categorical (or automatic)
exclusion of coverage for all health services related to gender transition is unlawful
on its face under paragraph (b)(4); in singling out the entire category of services and
treatments for gender-affirming care, such an exclusion systematically denies services
and treatments for transgender individuals and is prohibited discrimination on the
basis of sex.”).
239. Id. at 73.
240. 42 U.S.C. § 18116(a) (2016).
241. Id.
242. Franklin v. Gwinnett Cty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 65 (1992); Cannon v. Univ.
of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 709 (1979).
243. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 717.
244. Id. at 688. Citing its decision in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975), the Court
held that a court must first review the following four factors before deciding whether
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Title IX was modeled on Title VI of the Civil Rights Act,245 which was
intended to offer victims of discrimination a private cause of action.246
Litigants would thus have standing to bring a claim under Title IX,
through 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to challenge age-based restrictions in section
505.2. However, the likelihood of success of these claims may be
uncertain given courts’ interpretation of Title IX as it applies to
discrimination on the basis of gender identity.
Although HHS has made clear its view that discrimination on the
basis of transgender identity is unlawful under Title IX, courts have
not recognized transgender identity as a protected status under Title
IX. 247 For instance, in Johnston v. University of Pittsburgh, the
Western District of Pennsylvania held that a university receiving
federal funds did not violate Title IX by prohibiting a transgender
male student from using sex-segregated locker rooms and
bathrooms.248 In order to determine whether the language of Title IX
could be construed as prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
gender identity, the court referred to Title VII claims of employment
discrimination.249 Circuit Courts have generally held that Title VII
does not prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of gender
identity, but rather only prohibits employers from discriminating on
the basis of a traditional binary formulation of sex.250 Thus, while it

a federal statute provides a private of action: “1) whether the statute was enacted for
the benefit of a special class of which the plaintiff is a member, (2) whether there is
any indication of legislative intent to create a private remedy, (3) whether implication
of such a remedy is consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme,
and (4) whether implying a federal remedy is inappropriate because the subject
matter involves an area basically of concern to the States.” Id. at 689–709.
245. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (2012).
246. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 703 (“We have no doubt that Congress intended to create
Title IX remedies comparable to those available under Title VI and that it
understood Title VI as authorizing an implied private cause of action for victims of
the prohibited discrimination.”).
247. See Johnston v. Univ. of Pittsburgh of Commonwealth Sys. of Higher Educ.,
97 F. Supp. 3d 657, 674 (W.D. Pa. 2015); Letter from Leon Rodriguez, supra note 231.
248. Johnston, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 661.
249. Id. at 674.
250. Id. at 675 (citing Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir.
1984), which held: “The words of Title VII do not outlaw discrimination against a
person who has a sexual identity disorder, i.e., a person born with a male body who
believes himself to be female, or a person born with a female body who believes
herself to be male; a prohibition against discrimination based on an individual’s sex is
not synonymous with a prohibition against discrimination on an individual’s sexual
identity disorder or discontent with the sex into which they were born.”); see also
Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2007) (“In light of the
traditional binary conception of sex, transsexuals may not claim protection under
Title VII from discrimination based solely on their status as a transsexual.”).
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may be illegal to discriminate against a woman or a man because of
their sex assigned at birth, it is not unlawful to discriminate against a
transgender woman because of her transgender identity.251 Following
this reading of Title VII, the court in Johnston held that neither Title
VII nor Title IX would provide a basis for a discrimination claim on
the basis of transgender status without Congressional adoption of a
broader definition of “sex.”252
In order to avoid the plain language of Title VII or Title IX,
transgender litigants might argue that a denial of coverage was based
on their failure to meet sex stereotypes.253 In Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins,254 the Supreme Court held that an employer violated Title
VII when it denied a female employee a promotion on the grounds
that she did meet stereotypes associated with women.255 Transgender
litigants might find support with this theory as the Department of
Education has released letters of clarification, informing school
districts that it will apply the prohibition on sex-stereotyping of Title
VII to Title IX.256 Courts have also construed Title IX as prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of non-conformity with gender
stereotypes.257 However, it is not evident that litigants would prevail
under a sex-stereotyping theory, as the court in Johnston held that the
251. Ulane, 742 F. 2d at 1085; cf. Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 305
(D.D.C. 2008).
252. Johnston, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 676–77.
253. Id. at 679–80.
254. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989).
255. Id. at 250 (“[A]n employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman
cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender.”).
256. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFF. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON
TITLE IX AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE 5 (2014) (“Title IX’s sex discrimination prohibition
extends to claims of discrimination based on gender identity or failure to conform to
stereotypical notions of masculinity or femininity and OCR accepts such complaints
for investigation.”) http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/qa-201404-titleix.pdf [https://perma.cc/MR3D-7FXD]; Letter from Russlynn Ali, Assistant Sec’y for
Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., to Colleague (Oct. 26, 2010),
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201010.html
[https://perma.cc/NM6G-CFHN] (explaining to school officials across the country
that Title IX’s prohibition on sex discrimination prohibits harassment of lesbian, gay,
bisexual, or transgender students based on gender nonconformity)..
257. Letter from Russlynn Ali, supra note 256; see Wolfe v. Fayatteville, Ark. Sch.
Dist., 648 F. 3d 860, 867 (8th Cir. 2011) (upholding the district court’s jury
instructions that a Title IX claim must show that harassment in school was motivated
by the plaintiff’s “gender or his failure to conform to stereotypical male
characteristics”); Pratt v. Indian River Cent. Sch. Dist., 803 F. Supp. 2d 135, 151 & n.9
(N.D.N.Y. 2011) (noting that the Supreme Court looked to its interpretation of Title
VII when considering sex discrimination under Title IX in Davis v. Monroe County
Board of Education, 526 U.S. 629, 631 (1999), and Franklin v. Gwinnett County
Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60, 74 (1992)).
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University did not discriminate on the basis of sex stereotypes.258 The
court reasoned that instead of requiring that the student dress or act a
certain way consistent with a gender role, the University distinguished
the plaintiff from others on the basis of his sex assigned at birth.259
Thus, it may be difficult for litigants to pursue a sex-stereotyping
theory where the Medicaid program is not classifying or
distinguishing individuals on the basis of their conduct.
In addition to facing challenges as to whether Title IX would
prohibit the age-based restriction of Medicaid coverage, litigants
would also have to show that the restriction did in fact discriminate
on the basis of sex.260 Litigants might be able to argue that the age
restrictions are discriminatory as they deny transgender youth
medically necessary treatments that are otherwise offered to
cisgender youth.261 Claimants could offer evidence of the surgeries
such as “complete mastectomy, mammoplasty, plastic operation on
breasts, reconstructive surgery of the genitalia, amputation of the
penis, plastic operation on penis, orchiectomy, scrotoplasty,
urethroplasty, construction of artificial vagina with or without graft,
vulvectomy, episioplasty, salpingo-ooporectomy, and hysterectomy,”
are all listed on the state’s schedule for reimbursement and could thus
be available to cisgender minors who require these procedures for
conditions other than GD. 262 In addition, claimants could offer
evidence that puberty suppressors could be covered for cisgender
youth but not for transgender youth as the FDA has approved use of
certain hormones for the treatment of early onset puberty, diagnosed
as “precocious puberty.”263 For instance, New York’s Medicaid

258. Johnston, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 681.
259. Id.
260. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012).
261. Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary
Injunction and Class Certification at 3, Cruz v. Zucker, No. 14 CV 4456 (S.D.N.Y.
July 3, 2014).
262. Id. at 23–24 (citing N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 533.5 (2016)).
263. See, e.g., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., HIGHLIGHTS OF PRESCRIBING
INFORMATION:
SUPPRELIN
LA,
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2013/022058s011lbl.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CM4U-BS7E] (“SUPPRELIN LA (histrelin acetate) subcutaneous
implant is indicated for the treatment of children with central precocious puberty
(CPP).”); Regan Morris, Transgender 13-Year-Old Zoey Having Therapy, BBC (Jan.
12,
2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-30783983
[https://perma.cc/XNB3-MTVY] (“The puberty suppressors Zoey and others take are
reversible and FDA-approved because they have been used for decades in children
going through premature puberty.”).
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program currently covers prescriptions for the drug Lupron Depot,264
which has been approved by the FDA to treat precocious puberty.265
Showing this disparity in coverage could support a claim under the
ACA that the state is impermissibly limiting coverage on the basis of
transgender identity.
On the other hand, it is also unclear as to whether such evidence
would be sufficient, even if a court considers the view of HHS. While
Zucker proved to be successful and consisted of claims under the
Medicaid Act and Title IX, a case brought by transgender youth
would face a number of new obstacles. First, it may be difficult to
obtain evidence that Medicaid provides coverage for hormones for
cisgender adolescents or coverage for genital surgery.266 The state has
also asserted that the age restriction was put in place because the
FDA has not approved puberty suppressants or hormones to treat
GD for individuals under the age of eighteen.267 In at least one other
state, however, Medicaid would cover puberty suppressants because
the FDA has approved the use of such drugs to treat precocious
puberty.268 The conflicting views of the HHS and the courts as to
whether Title IX would prohibit discrimination on the basis of
transgender identity provide support and opposition to the assertion
that the age-based restriction is vulnerable to legal challenges.
Further, it is also unclear whether or not there would be factual or
legal support for a discrimination claim under the ACA and,
consequently, whether the age-based-restriction on Medicaid
coverage leaves the state vulnerable to legal challenges brought by
individuals.

264. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, MEDICAID LIST OF REIMBURSABLE DRUGS 273
(2016), https://www.emedny.org/info/fullform.pdf [https://perma.cc/N88G-DNEK].
265. See generally U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., LUPRON DEPOT (LEOPROLIDE
ACETATE FOR DEPOT SUSPENSION) PRESCRIBING INFORMATION (2013)
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2013/019732s040,020517s035lbl.
pdf [https://perma.cc/66Q5-3PZX].
266. A 2013 report on a pilot program for Medicaid of precocious puberty noted
that there were fewer than 300 patients who sought puberty suppressors for
precocious puberty. FLA. AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE ADMIN., FLORIDA MEDICAID
SPECIALTY PHARMACY PILOT PROGRAM FOR CENTRAL PRECOCIOUS PUBERTY
IMPLEMENTATION
AND
STATUS
3
(2013),
https://ahca.myflorida.com/Medicaid/recent_presentations/CPP_Report_Final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N7KA-6J5T].
267. N.Y. DEP’T OF HEALTH, TRANSGENDER RELATED CARE AND SERVICES 13–14,
(2015)
http://health.ny.gov/regulations/recently_adopted/docs/2015-0311_transgender_related_care_and_services.pdf [https://perma.cc/RL3M-DMYS].
268. Morris, supra note 263.
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Age Restrictions May Be Vulnerable to Challenges Under the
Reasonable Standards Requirement of the Medicaid Act

In addition to claims brought by individuals, New York’s age-based
restriction on Medicaid coverage of gender-affirming healthcare may
also face enforcement actions by HHS for violating Title XIX of the
Social Security Act (the Medicaid Act). While individuals do not
have a private right of action under the Medicaid Act, the Secretary
of HHS is authorized to withhold Medicaid funds from a state that
violates the Medicaid Act.269 The Medicaid Act requires states to
implement Medicaid programs with “reasonable standards”270 that
must aim to provide medical services “sufficient in amount, duration,
and scope to reasonably achieve its purpose.”271 In addition, states
may not arbitrarily deny or reduce treatment solely because of the
type of illness.272 Because there is some support from the medical
community that gender affirming treatment is medically necessary for
adolescents, the Secretary could find that the age-based restriction is
unreasonable.273 In this circumstance, New York could risk the
withdrawal of Medicaid funding by the Secretary of HHS.

a.

The Medicaid Act Conditions Federal Funding of State Medicaid
Programs on Certain Requirements

Medicaid regulations that limit coverage of gender-affirming
healthcare on the basis of age might be viewed as failing to comply
with the requirements of the Medicaid Act.274 The objective of the
Medicaid Act was to enable states to provide medical assistance to
those who could not afford it.275 In order to meet this objective, the
Medicaid Act authorizes the federal government to disburse funds to
states with Medicaid programs that provide medical assistance and
treatment to individuals who meet income and categorical eligibility
requirements.276

269. 42 U.S.C. § 1396(c) (2012).
270. See Lankford v. Sherman, 451 F.3d 496, 506 (8th Cir. 2006) (“While a state
has considerable discretion to fashion medical assistance under its Medicaid plain,
this discretion is constrained by the reasonable-standards requirement.”).
271. 42 C.F.R. § 440.230 (2012).
272. Id.
273. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) (2012).
274. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396 et seq (2012).
275. Schweiker v. Hogan, 457 U.S. 569, 571–72 (1982).
276. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b (2012).
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The Supreme Court views the Medicaid Act as a contract between
the states and the federal government.277 States thus must comply
with federal Medicaid statutes and regulations in order to receive
federal Medicaid funds.278 Under § 1396(c) of the Medicaid Act, the
Secretary of HHS is authorized to withhold all or a portion of a state’s
Medicaid funds when a state “breaches” the contract by failing to
comply with the requirements of the Act.279 In Armstrong v.
Exceptional Child Center, the Court held that Congress intended §
1396(c) to be the exclusive remedy for a state’s failure to comply with
the Act.280 Under this framework, the Court held that the Medicaid
Act does not provide an implied right of action and, therefore, may
not be enforced by private claims.281 As such, states will not face
private litigation under the Medicaid Act, but could still face
enforcement action from the Secretary of HHS.

b.

Programs That Restrict Coverage of Gender-Affirming
Healthcare May Be Interpreted as Unreasonable

Section 1396(a) of the Medicaid Act requires that all state
Medicaid programs provide coverage for seven broad categories of
medical assistance: inpatient hospital, outpatient hospital, laboratory
and x-ray, nursing facility, physician, nurse-midwife, and nursepractitioner services.282 States may also provide coverage for optional
services, such as prescription drugs;283 however, they must comply
with federal regulations if they choose to do so.284 While the Medicaid
Act broadly requires that these services be provided, states have the
authority to decide the type and range of services covered and the
eligibility of individuals.285 In determining the scope of coverage,
states must use “reasonable standards . . . for determining eligibility

277. Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr. Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1387 (2015) (citing
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17, (1981)).
278. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396, 1396a, 1396c (2012).
279. 42 U.S.C. § 1396c (2012).
280. Armstrong, 135 S. Ct. at 1385.
281. Id.
282. 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(10)(A); Lankford v. Sherman, 451 F.3d 496, 504 (8th Cir.
2006) (“To receive federal approval the Medicaid act mandates that a plan include
only seven enumerated medical services.”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(1) (2012).
283. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(11)–(12).
284. Lankford, 541 F.3d at 504.
285. 42 C.F.R. § 430.0 (2012) (“Within broad Federal rules, each State decides
eligible groups, types and range of services, payment levels for services, and
administrative and operating procedures.”).
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for and the extent of medical assistance.”286 These standards must be
“based on such criteria as medical necessity or on utilization control
procedures”287 and may not deny or reduce coverage of a medical
treatment “to an otherwise eligible beneficiary solely because of the
diagnosis, type of illness, or condition.”288 Further, federal Medicaid
regulations require that each service that is covered under a state’s
plan “must be sufficient in amount, duration, and scope to reasonably
achieve its purpose.”289 A state plan that chooses to cover a service,
therefore cannot arbitrarily exclude coverage for certain items or
treatments within that service.290
There is support for viewing the age-based restriction of section
505.2 as an unreasonable standard and, therefore, not in compliance
with the Medicaid Act. In Lankford v. Sherman, for instance, the
Eighth Circuit held that a plan that excludes a non-experimental and
medically necessary treatment from a covered service is per se
unreasonable.291 Additionally, in Beal v. Doe, the Supreme Court
noted in dicta that a Medicaid program seriously conflicts with the
objectives of the Medicaid Act if it does not cover medically
necessary treatment.292 Given that HHS has already acknowledged
the medical necessity of gender-affirming healthcare for Medicare
recipients,293 it may similarly view exclusion of these services from
coverage as unreasonable.
Section 505.2 may also be construed as unreasonable should the
Secretary find that it is discriminatory. The Medicaid Act requires
that “the medical assistance made available to any individual . . . shall
not be less in amount, duration, or scope than the medical assistance

286. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 441 (1977) (“Although
[the Medicaid Act] does not require States to provide funding for all medical
treatment falling within the [seven] general categories, it does require that state
Medicaid plans establish “reasonable standards . . . for determining . . . the extent of
medical assistance under the plan which . . . are consistent with the objectives of [the
Act].”).
287. 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(d) (2012).
288. Id. § 440.230(c).
289. Id. § 440.230(b).
290. Lankford, 541 F.3d at 511.
291. Id. (“[F]ailure to provide Medicaid coverage for non-experimental, medicallynecessary services within a covered Medicaid category is both per se unreasonable
and inconsistent with the stated goals of Medicaid.”).
292. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 444–45 (1977) (discussing the validity of a Medicaid
program that did not cover abortion, the Court noted, “[a]lthough serious statutory
questions might be presented if a state Medicaid plan excluded necessary medical
treatment from its coverage, it is hardly inconsistent with the objectives of the Act for
a State to refuse to fund unnecessary though perhaps desirable medical services”).
293. H.H.S. Medicare Decision, supra note 84, at 20.
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made available to any other such individual” who is covered by that
state’s Medicaid program.294 In addition, a state “may not arbitrarily
reduce the amount, duration, or scope of a required service . . . solely
because of the diagnosis, type of illness, or condition.”295 Should the
Secretary view the age-based restrictions as limiting coverage on the
basis of a condition, it may find that section 505.2 violates the
Medicaid Act. However, similar to a Title IX claim, the Secretary
would have to find evidence that certain treatments are covered for
cisgender youth, but not for transgender youth when intended to treat
GD. There may be little evidence to suggest that cisgender youth
have greater access to puberty suppressors or other procedures that
might also be gender-affirming treatments.
The Secretary could also find that the age restrictions are
unreasonable, as they contradict the Medicaid Act’s requirement that
state plans provide Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic, and
Treatment (EPSDT). The Medicaid Act mandates all states to
provide EPSDT for Medicaid eligible children under the age of
twenty-one.296 EPSDT consists of regular screenings and treatment of
“mental illnesses and conditions discovered by screening services,
whether or not such services are covered under the State plan.”297 As
such, EPSDT requires states to provide screening and treatment for
Medicaid-eligible children.298 An adolescent could therefore be
diagnosed with GD under EPSDT and require treatment but
ultimately be denied treatment because of the age-based restrictions
of section 505. However, at least one court has found that EPSDT
services are still subject to, and may be denied on, the basis of the
state’s determination that such treatment is not medically necessary.299
The state may therefore be vulnerable to enforcement action by
the HHS on the basis that the age-based restriction is unreasonable
and violates the Medicaid Act. While there is some support to
suggest that the HHS could proceed with such an action, the
Secretary may also be unable to do so without greater evidence of the
medical necessity of gender-affirming treatments for adolescents and
evidence that the age-based restriction discriminates on the basis of
transgender identity.

294. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(B); 42 C.F.R. § 440.240(a).
295. 42 C.F.R. §440.230(c); Lankford, 541 F.3d at 506.
296. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r).
297. Id. § 1396d(r)(5).
298. Id. § 1396d(r); D.U. v. Rhoades, No. 13-CV-1457, 2015 WL 224932, at *1
(E.D. Wis. Jan. 15, 2015) (finding that daycare was not medically necessary).
299. Rhoades, 2015 WL 224932, at *1.

2016]

FIXING MEDICAID TO "FIX SOCIETY"

121

III. PROPOSAL FOR MEDICAID REGULATIONS THAT
EXTEND COVERAGE TO TRANSGENDER YOUTH
Given the myriad of issues that arise from Medicaid regulations
that exclude coverage of gender-affirming healthcare on the basis of
age, states should consider viable alternatives. One alternative to the
age-based restriction is to replace the bright-line age limit with a caseby-case assessment of the individual recipient that is aligned with the
WPATH Standards of Care.300 This Part explains how replacing the
restrictions would ensure that the state’s Medicaid program covers
medically necessary treatment, resolve any conflicts that the Medicaid
program might have with the doctrine of informed consent, and avoid
the risk of litigation that the state might face under the current agebased restriction. Further, this Part discusses the likely policy
outcomes and costs that justify removing the age-based restriction.
A. Necessary Provisions for a Trans-Inclusive Medicaid Program
to Meet Medical and Legal Standards
States would avoid the issues that age restrictions present by
amending or enacting regulations that are aligned with the WPATH
Standard of Care. In so doing, states would provide for a more
flexible approach that is based on the individual recipient’s need for
treatment.301 Additionally, removing the blanket age restriction
would allow states to comply with principles of informed consent and
recognize the exceptions to informed consent.302 States would further
find that aligning Medicaid regulations with the WPATH Standard of
Care would provide safeguards against inadequate treatment and
erroneous diagnoses of GD.

1.

States Should Align Regulations with WPATH Standards

States should amend their Medicaid regulations so as to align them
with the WPATH Standards of Care. By doing so, states would avoid
possible HHS litigation and regulation.303 Aligning regulations to the
WPATH Standards of Care would also avoid conflicts with the
medical consensus on gender identity because it would determine
coverage on an individualized basis, provide sufficient safeguards so
as to ensure that individuals receive care they need, provide standards
to determine whether health professionals are eligible to treat
300.
301.
302.
303.

See generally WPATH, supra note 23.
See discussion supra Section II.A.
See discussion supra Section II.B.
See discussion supra Section II.C.
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transgender patients, and develop contemporaneously with research
in the field.304 By aligning regulations with the WPATH Standards of
Care, states would remove the age restrictions for Medicaid coverage
of gender-affirming healthcare and also address the concerns of cost
and efficacy on which the age restriction is predicated.305

a. Aligning Regulations with the WPATH Standards of Care
Would Determine Coverage on an Individual Basis Rather Than a
Fixed Age
By aligning their Medicaid statutes with the WPATH Standards of
Care, states would determine Medicaid coverage for gender-affirming
healthcare on a basis that is more consistent with the generally
accepted view of the medical community. The Standards of Care
provides guidelines for mental health practitioners working with
gender-nonconforming youth, noting that health professionals should
work with individuals to assess their desire and medical necessity for
gender-affirming healthcare.306
This approach is preferable to
determining eligibility for gender-affirming healthcare on the basis of
a fixed-age limit, as psychology experts have argued that
“psychological
and
somatic
maturity
varies
largely
307
interindividually.”
Given the varying levels of maturity between
individuals under the age of eighteen, experts have found that a
determination of treatment based on a fixed age is arbitrary and less
appropriate than a determination based on individual evaluation.308
Determining Medicaid coverage on an individual basis would
further avoid the potential litigation described in Part II of this
Note.309 Providing coverage on an individual basis would preclude
challenges under the ACA.310 Also, as noted earlier, challenges under
the ACA would likely assert that state plans discriminate on the basis
of gender identity by providing coverage for hormone therapy and
gender-affirming surgical procedures for cisgender adolescents but
not for transgender adolescents.311 Under the individualized approach
of the Standards of Care, states would provide these same treatments
on the permissible basis of medical necessity, allowing for some

304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.

See discussion supra Section II.A.
See discussion supra Section II.C.2.
See discussion supra Section II.A.
COHEN-KETTENIS & PFÄFFLIN , supra note 47, at 179.
See id.
See discussion supra Section II.C.
See discussion supra Section II.C.
See discussion supra Section II.C.1.
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transgender adolescents to access treatment.
Litigants would
therefore be unlikely to assert that the individualized approach
determines coverage on the impermissible basis of gender identity.
Adopting the WPATH Standards of Care would also avoid HHS
enforcement actions. Under the Medicaid Act, the Secretary of HHS
is authorized to withhold Medicaid funds when states violate the
Medicaid Act.312 Under a WPATH-aligned regulation, the Secretary
would not be authorized to withhold funds on the grounds that the
state was failing to provide reasonable standards. Further, if states
amended regulations to expressly align with the WPATH Standards
of Care, they would ensure that the Medicaid regulations remained
reasonable even as the field of transgender health developed. As an
international organization, WPATH has issued new editions of the
Standards of Care to remain consistent with developments in the field
of transgender health. For instance, transgender advocates and
health professionals have noted that the most recent edition of the
Standards of Care made a number of significant modifications and
improvements.313
In addition to providing a medically sound basis for extending
coverage to transgender youth, aligning regulations with the WPATH
Standards of Care would provide quality control measures to ensure
individuals receive proper healthcare and assessment. The WPATH
Standards of Care set forth standards of competency for health
professionals working with transgender youth that exceeds standards
of competency observed in New York.314 Under section 505.2, mental
health professionals are authorized to refer patients for genderaffirming healthcare if they are qualified New York state-licensed
professionals.315 The WPATH provides a higher standard, requiring
that health professionals have knowledge of gender-nonconformity

312. 42 U.S.C. § 1396c (2012).
313. Among the changes that advocates have noted in Volume 7 of the WPATH
Standards of Care are: the recognition that gender nonconformity is not at disorder,
that attempts to change a person’s gender identity through therapy are ineffective,
and discussion of a wider range of treatment options. Nat’l Ctr. for Transgender
Equality, The Top 10 Things Trans People Should Know About the New Standards
of Care, ADVANCING TRANSGENDER EQUALITY (Sept. 26, 2011, 5:33 PM),
https://transgenderequality.wordpress.com/2011/09/26/the-top-10-things-trans-peopleshould-know-about-the-new-standards-of-care [https://perma.cc/N3AL-X9C2].
314. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 505.2(l) (2016); WPATH, supra note
23, at 22.
315. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 505.2(l) (gender-affirming surgery will
be covered where the Medicaid recipient has “letters from two qualified New York
State licensed health professionals who have independently assessed the individual
and are referring the individual for the surgery”).
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and assessment of gender dysphoria treatment and that they pursue
continuing education of gender dysphoria assessment.316 These
requirements would provide stronger safeguards to ensure Medicaid
recipients receive gender-affirming healthcare when it is necessary.
Further, these safeguards would also encourage medical professionals
to develop their cultural competency317 when working with
transgender youth, and prevent litigation under the ACA’s provision
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of gender identity.

2.

New York Should Align Its Regulation with the Exceptions for
Informed Consent

A state regulation that does not implement an age-based restriction
on Medicaid coverage of gender-affirming healthcare would also
avoid conflicting with the principles of the informed consent doctrine
and its exceptions. As noted in Part II of this Note, a fixed-age
restriction would conflict with the doctrine of informed consent and
the exceptions to informed consent.318 Age-based restrictions bar
youth that have been deemed “mature minors” from accessing
gender-affirming healthcare, despite the youth’s authorization to
provide informed consent. States that remove age limits in their
Medicaid regulations will allow these youth, who are deemed capable
of giving informed consent, the ability to make their own health
choices pursuant to their status-based exception. Further, removing
the age-based restrictions would also be consistent with the
procedure-based exceptions that many states have. As noted in Part
II, states permit minors to provide informed consent to certain kinds
of procedures that are medically necessary but, nonetheless, require
parental consent, such as contraceptives, abortions, and mental
health.319
Gender-affirming healthcare could be considered
comparable to these types of procedures in that they are medically
necessary but are often denied as a result of parents’ refusal to
consent. In New York, youth are permitted to consent to certain
kinds of mental health treatments yet are statutorily prohibited from
consenting to gender-affirming healthcare, which is intended to treat

316. Id.
317. Id. “Cultural competency refers to the ability to understand, communicate
with, and effectively interact with diverse populations, and it can be measured by
awareness, attitude, knowledge, skills, behaviors, policies, procedures, and
organizational systems.” Willy Wilkinson, Keywords, 1 TSQ: TRANSGENDER STUD.
Q. 68 (2015).
318. See discussion supra Section II.B.
319. See discussion supra Section II.C.1.
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the mental condition of gender dysphoria. By removing the agebased restriction, youth would be permitted to consent to genderaffirming healthcare, as they would be permitted to consent to other
forms of mental health treatment.
While the removing the age restrictions would allow states to
consistently recognize the exceptions to informed consent, it would
not necessarily remove the requirement for informed consent.
Research suggests that there may not be an entirely objective
criterion for diagnosing GD, such as chromosomes or hormonal
levels.320 Moreover, because an individual’s gender identity is defined
solely by his or her own intrinsic sense of gender, a regulation that did
not require that the recipient be capable of understanding the
consequences of undergoing gender-affirming procedures would
contradict WPATH Standards, which also require the treating
physician to abide by informed-consent law. States that amend their
regulations to remove the age restrictions would therefore provide
access for youth who need gender-affirming healthcare and who have
the mental and emotional capacity to understand their decision to
pursue treatment for GD.
B.

Policy Justifications for Extending Medicaid Coverage of
Gender-Affirming Healthcare

Removing the age-based restrictions to Medicaid coverage may
also have a number of positive policy implications. Lifting the agebased restriction in section 505.2 would align New York’s Medicaid
coverage of gender-affirming treatment for youths with that of state
agencies responsible for youths in custody. In addition, restricting
access to gender-affirming surgery that results in sterilization may
prevent transgender youth who are over eighteen from obtaining the
benefits that conform with their gender identity.321 Therefore, youth
may be denied benefits because they sought medically necessary
treatment. Most importantly, by denying transgender youth in New
York access to gender-affirming care, the state requires them to
endure mental distress and, in so doing, puts them at a greater risk of
physical harm.

320. See COHEN-KETTENIS & PFÄFFLIN , supra note 47, at 265 (describing a twophase, holistic test to diagnose GD).
321. Anne E. Silver, An Offer You Can’t Refuse: Coercing Consent to Surgery
Through the Medicalization of Gender Identity, 26 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 488, 496–
97 (2014) (discussing how many states follow a medical model of legal gender that
“places legal significance on the treatments and surgery that a person has
completed”).
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1. Replacing the Age-Based Restrictions Will Resolve the Disparity
in Health Coverage That Youth May Receive When in Custody of the
State
Removing the age-based restriction of Medicaid coverage of
gender-affirming treatment would avoid a negative policy outcome
whereby youth find they have access to gender-affirming treatment
while in the custody of the state but do not have access to those same
treatments when they are covered by Medicaid. The Administration
for Children’s Services (ACS) is the agency responsible for
supervising child welfare, foster care, and juvenile justice in New
York City.322 ACS is required by law to provide “necessary medical
or surgical care . . . for any child needing such care and [to] pay for
such care from public funds, if necessary.”323 In In re Brian L., the
New York Appellate Division interpreted this statute to require ACS
to pay for all necessary care, including that which is not covered by
the state’s Medicaid regulations.324 Following the decision in Brian L.,
ACS released guidelines and procedures for requesting payment for
Non-Medicaid Reimbursable Treatments (NMR), which were later
amended to provide reimbursements of “gender-affirming healthcare
associated with Gender Dysphoria,” often referred to as “transrelated healthcare.”325
Thus, under the NMR guidelines, children in ACS foster care or in
the custody of New York State may be eligible for reimbursement for
gender-affirming healthcare.326 In addition, the NMR guidelines also
permit ACS to override the objection of parents or foster parents to

322. About
ACS,
ADMIN.
FOR
CHILDREN’S
SERVS.
(2016),
http://www1.nyc.gov/site/acs/about/about.page [https://perma.cc/CM8S-ESRS].
323. N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 398 (McKinney 2016).
324. Brian L. v. Admin. for Child. Servs., 51 A.D.3d 488, 494 (2008) (emphasis
added) (“The plain meaning of that sentence—and the one that gives it effect—is
that ACS has a duty to provide necessary medical and surgical care to all of the
children in its care and must, if necessary, pay for that care. The second sentence of
that section, read in a manner that gives it effect and places it in harmony with the
first, identifies the source from which certain medical expenditures must be paid; that
sentence does not mean that children in ACS’ care who are eligible for Medicaid are
limited to the medical and surgical care covered by that program.”).
325. ADMIN. FOR CHILD. SERVS., ACS INTERIM POLICY ON NON-MEDICAID
REIMBURSABLE
TREATMENTS
AND
SERVICES
(Dec.
16,
2014),
http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/acs/pdf/lgbtq/14_12_16_NMR_signed_interim_policy.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LJ9T-XQVF] [hereinafter NMR POLICY]; Memorandum from
Benita Miller, Deputy Comm’r of N.Y.C. Admin. for Child. Servs., on NMR
Guidance for Trans-Related Healthcare to ACS and Provider Agency Staff (Jan. 29,
2013),
https://www.nycourts.gov/ip/judicialinstitute/transgender/220S.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LRK6-QR75].
326. NMR POLICY, supra note 325.
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the child receiving gender-affirming healthcare.327 These guidelines
may be a response to In re D.F. v. Carrion,328 where the New York
Supreme Court found that ACS’s denial of reimbursement for sexreassignment surgery and hormone therapy was arbitrary and
capricious.329 Similarly, youth who are in the custody of the State
Office of Children and Family Services (OCFS) may have access to
gender-affirming healthcare. In particular, OCFS’s Division of
Juvenile Justice, which operates facilities for juvenile offenders, has
its own Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Questioning Youth
(LGBTQY) policy.330 This policy allows for youth to begin hormone
therapy while they are in an OCFS facility if they meet the criteria for
treatment in the WPATH Standards of Care.331
By restricting Medicaid coverage of gender-affirming healthcare on
the basis of age, the New York regulation may promote negative
policy. Youth who are in the custody of ACS or OCFS may be less
inclined to reunite with their families and communities if they risk
losing hormone therapy as a result. Therefore, youth who are aware
of the possibility of obtaining gender-affirming healthcare may also
be inclined to either enter or remain in the custody of the state. Thus,
removing the age-based restrictions of Medicaid coverage for genderaffirming treatment would achieve two positive outcomes. First, it
would allow for greater uniformity between the healthcare that is
covered under Medicaid and that provided by ACS and OCFS.
Second, by creating greater uniformity of coverage, the state would
avoid creating incentives for youth to remain in the custody of the
state or to enter into the custody of the state, where they may be able
to obtain gender-affirming healthcare.

2.

Removing Age-Based Restrictions Will Allow Individuals to
Obtain Benefits Based on Their Legal Sex Without Delay

Lifting age-based restrictions for Medicaid coverage would also
allow individuals to obtain a legal-sex status that is congruent with
their gender identity. Legal sex is an individual’s sex identity as

327. Id. at 7.
328. In re D.F. v. Carrion, 43 Misc.3d 746 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2014).
329. Id. at 758.
330. N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF CHILDREN & FAMILY SERVS., POLICY & PROCEDURES
MANUAL: LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND QUESTIONING YOUTH (2008).
331. Id. (“OCFS will make a determination regarding the initiation of hormone
therapy based on accepted standards of care (see WPATH standards of care for
GID) and the youth’s best interest. Appropriate consent must first be sought and
obtained as required by law.”).
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recognized by the law and is typically defined as one’s sex assignment
at birth, based on biological genitalia.332 Legal rights and benefits are
bound to legal sex as it may determine an individual’s marital rights,
parental rights, placement in sex-segregated facilities such as prisons
or homeless shelters, and the ability to access social services.333 Thus
in order for transgender individuals to obtain benefits and rights that
are congruent with their gender identity, they must first seek to
obtain or amend their government identification so that it is
congruent with their gender identity.334
Typically, requirements for changing gender markers on
identification vary by state and form of identification. While the
federal government has amended its requirements for passports,
asking for “appropriate clinical treatment for gender transition to the
new gender,” states still typically require documentation of genital
surgery in order to change the legal gender of a birth certificate.335
Though New York does not require genital surgery to change the
gender marker on a birth certificate, an age-restriction that does
impose this requirement would force transgender youth to live with
an incongruent legal gender and deny them the rights and protections
that a correct gender marker would confer. Without a congruent
legal sex, trans youth risk being placed in schools, foster homes, and
juvenile justice centers that are incongruent with their gender
identity.336
Thus, removing the age-based restriction in states that condition
legal sex on GD treatment would allow individuals to obtain a legalgender status that is congruent with their gender identity. Doing so
would result in youth obtaining gender-appropriate services, rights,
and protections that they may not otherwise be afforded.

332. Silver, supra note 321, at 490.
333. Id. at 492–93; see SYLVIA RIVERA PROJECT, IT’S A WAR IN HERE: A REPORT
ON THE TREATMENT OF TRANSGENDER AND INTERSEX PEOPLE IN NEW YORK STATE
MEN’S PRISONS 17 (2007), http://srlp.org/files/warinhere.pdf [https://perma.cc/S6B7WALY]; Deborah Sontag, Transgender Woman Cites Attacks and Abuse in Men’s
Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2015, at A1.
334. Silver, supra note 321, at 493.
335. Dean Spade, Documenting Gender, 59 HASTING L.J. 731, 768 (2008); Know
Your Rights: Changing Birth Certificate Sex Designations: State-by-State Guidelines,
LAMDA LEGAL, http://www.lambdalegal.org/know-your-rights/transgender/changingbirth-certificate-sex-designations [https://perma.cc/ND6G-SPM6] (last updated Feb.
3, 2015).
336. See Silver, supra note 321, at 496.
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Mental Harm and Risk of Violence That Transgender Youth
Face Without Treatment

The most unfortunate result of the age-based restriction in section
505.2 is the psychological pain that it would force transgender youth
to endure. Psychological authorities, including WPATH, the APA,
and the AMA, as well as experts in the field, have recognized that
adolescents under the age of eighteen may experience gender
dysphoria.337 For some transgender adolescents, these feelings of
distress may escalate to the point where youth experience “intense
mental misery, isolation and despair if they are prevented from
comprehensively living out their wish to belong to the other sex.”338
For these individuals, a regulation that prevents them from obtaining
puberty suppressors or other gender-affirming treatment may, thus,
force them to endure great psychological pain against the
recommendation of their own mental health practitioners.
Evidence also suggests that delaying treatment of gender dysphoria
may also allow comorbid mental conditions—distinct mental
conditions that are co-occurring with GD—to persist.339 Adolescents
and children experiencing gender dysphoria have shown elevated
levels of emotional problems.340 In adolescents, the most common
comorbid mental disorders are anxiety and depression.341 A number
of studies have found that transgender youth are at an elevated risk
for suicidal ideation and attempts.342 One study that focused on
transgender youth, aged fifteen to twenty-one, found that forty-five
percent of the participants had thought seriously about killing
themselves, and half said that these thoughts were related to their
transgender status.343
Another study that was not limited to

337. WPATH, supra note 23, at 12; DSM-V, supra note 17, at 452; AMA
RESOLUTION 122, supra note 19; Wren, supra note 90, at 221.
338. Wren, supra note 90, at 221.
339. DSM-V, supra note 17, at 458, 459; SUICIDE PREVENTION RES. CTR., SUICIDE
RISK AND PREVENTION FOR LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER YOUTH
(2008),
http://www.sprc.org/sites/sprc.org/files/library/SPRC_LGBT_Youth.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3MAJ-LS7A].
340. DSM-V, supra note 17, at 458.
341. Id. at 459.
342. SUICIDE PREVENTION RES. CTR., supra note 339; Jose M. Valderas, Defining
Comorbidity: Implications for Understanding Health and Health Services, 7 ANNALS
OF FAM. MED. 357, 358 (2009) (“Comorbidity is most often defined in relation to a
specific index condition, as in the seminal definition of Feinstein: ‘Any distinct
additional entity that has existed or may occur during the clinical course of a patient
who has the index disease under study.’”).
343. Id. (citing A.H. Grossman & A.R. D’Augelli, Transgender Youth and LifeThreatening Behaviors, 37 SUICIDE & LIFE-THREATENING BEHAV. 527–37 (2007)).
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transgender youth found that rates of suicidal ideation were highest
amongst participants aged thirteen to nineteen.344
Studies suggest that depression, anxiety, and suicidal ideation may
not be caused by gender dysphoria alone but, rather, is the result of
being targets of negative societal attitudes.
Mental health
professionals have found that an individual’s minority status as
transgender places him or her at risk of being prejudiced or
discriminated against, which in turn may induce anxiety or
depression.345 The negative attitudes that a transgender youth
experiences can “become internalized, manifesting as negative selfconcept, self-destructive behaviors, and low self-esteem.”346 In a
study conducted by the Virginia Transgender Health Initiative,
transgender youth who had been the victimized at school were almost
four times more likely to attempt suicide than those who had not.347
New York’s Medicaid restriction on hormone therapy and gender
affirming surgery will force transgender youth to endure
psychological pain.
There is little evidence to show that
psychotherapy alone can alleviate feelings of gender dysphoria for
individuals who meet the criteria for physical intervention.348 In
contrast, the general conclusion drawn from studies measuring the
success of hormone therapy and gender affirming surgery is that these
treatments effectively resolve the gender dysphoria experienced by
transgender individuals.349 As a result, a regulation that delays access
to hormone therapy and gender affirming surgery will force some
number of transgender youth to endure psychological pain.
Delaying access to gender-affirming care may also exacerbate any
comorbid mental health issues that a transgender individual is
experiencing.
The anxiety and depression resulting from the
adolescent process of consolidating and forming one’s identity by
evaluating it in relation to society may be exacerbated if that
individual is unable to substantively acknowledge his or her
identity.350 A transgender youth who is denied access to gender-

344. Peter Goldblum et al., The Relationship Between Gender-Based
Victimization and Suicide Attempts in Transgender People, 43 PROF. PSYCHOL. 468,
470 (2002).
345. WPATH, supra note 23, at 4.
346. Goldblum et al., supra note 344, at 469.
347. Id. at 472.
348. COHEN-KETTENIS & PFÄFFLIN , supra note 47, at 141.
349. Id. at 148.
350. Wren, supra note 90, at 225 (“If identity is ‘our changing knowledge of who
we are and how we are placed as a person in relation to all those around us’ (Shotter,
1998: 281) then the healthy adolescents need to find an ‘evaluative space’ that fits
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affirming healthcare, and is unable to openly acknowledge a major
dimension of his or her subjectivity, may continue to struggle with this
identity forming process in a way that induces anxiety or
depression.351 In addition, the denial of early treatment may further
expose an individual to minority status and victimization. Puberty
suppressors, gender-affirming surgeries, or hormone treatments prior
to the development of secondary sex characteristics will facilitate
transgender youth to outwardly express their gender identity to
others, in a manner that makes them less susceptible to
victimization.352 Further, a more inclusive regulation may help
communities accept the existence of adolescent gender dysphoria,
which in turn may reduce the negative societal attitudes concerning
transgender youth.
C.

Cost Justifications for Extending Medicaid Coverage of
Gender-Affirming Healthcare to Transgender Youth

A state regulation that extended Medicaid coverage of genderaffirming healthcare to individuals on a case-by-case basis might incur
some additional costs by allowing greater access to gender affirming
treatment. However, these costs would be justified because they
would be only marginally greater than the cost of providing coverage
with an age-based restriction. Further, an amended regulation would
avoid other costs that the age restrictions would give rise to and
would provide transgender youth with necessary medical care.

1.

Removing the Age Restriction Would Impose a Marginal Cost
on States That Have Extended Medicaid Coverage for GenderAffirming Healthcare

States may be able to estimate the additional cost of removing the
age restriction for gender-affirming coverage. New York has
estimated the cost of extending coverage of gender-affirming
healthcare to individuals above the age of eighteen as $6,737,000.353
The estimate was based on the number of Medicaid recipients who
receive mental health services with a diagnosis of gender dysphoria

with their most profound sense of self. They need to give substance to their sense of
personal identity; it cannot be a purely inner and silent experience.”).
351. Id. (“If gender dysphoric children grow up without any acknowledgement of a
major dimension of their subjectivity (if it is kept secret) or with responses that are
incredulous, disgusted or dismissive, they will lack the necessary support to do
identity work, to build up ‘identity capital.’”).
352. COHEN-KETTENIS & PFÄFFLIN, supra note 47, at 140.
353. N.Y. DEP’T OF HEALTH, supra NOTE 267.
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and the number of those recipients who would seek hormone therapy
only, partial gender affirming surgery, or full gender affirming
surgery.354 States could conceivably make similar calculations to
determine the cost of extending Medicaid coverage to transgender
youth.
Given the basis of New York’s calculation for the cost of extending
Medicaid coverage to transgender recipients over the age of eighteen,
it is unlikely that extending coverage to transgender youth would
create additional costs beyond what is spent on covering adults. The
WPATH standards also make clear that adolescents experiencing GD
still may not be ready or need hormone therapy until they are older.355
Thus, lifting the restriction would not necessarily require the state to
cover gender-affirming treatment for all adolescents who experience
GD. In addition, studies suggest that adolescents who experience
gender dysphoria most often continue to experience it into adulthood
and eventually seek gender-affirming healthcare.356 Removing the
restrictions would therefore not add any significant new cost but,
rather, would address the needs of transgender Medicaid recipients
earlier. While allowing youth to access gender-affirming healthcare
would likely increase the cost to some extent, as there would be
greater access to the treatment, this would likely be marginal.

2.

Removing the Age Restrictions Would Avoid Other Costs

While removing the age restriction would be unlikely to increase
the costs of extending coverage to individuals over the age of
eighteen, increasing access to gender-affirming healthcare would
likely avoid costs incurred by delaying treatment. Studies indicate
that earlier treatment may be more effective at alleviating GD, as
individuals have not fully developed the secondary sex characteristics
that cause them distress.357 As a result, earlier treatment may prevent
necessity for later, more expensive surgical procedures such as gender
affirming surgery.358 Therefore, in states such as New York, removing
the age restriction might avoid the cost of covering these procedures
in some cases, which would be more expensive than early hormone
therapy.359

354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.

Id.
WPATH, supra note 23, at 12.
COHEN-KETTENIS & PFÄFFLIN, supra note 47, at 146.
Id. at 140.
Id. at 144.
HORTON, supra note 32.
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In addition to avoiding the cost of gender affirming surgery,
providing access to gender-affirming healthcare for transgender youth
would also avoid costs that are incurred to treat comorbid conditions
of GD. By treating GD earlier, states would likely see savings related
to mental health.360 Mental health experts have noted that the
emotional and developmental arrest caused by GD is best treated
earlier.361 Therefore, removing the age restrictions might avoid the
costs of mental health measures, such as mental health counseling,
that might otherwise be incurred where individuals experience GD
for a longer period of time. Additionally, removing the age
restrictions on Medicaid coverage would avoid the costs associated
with life-threatening behavior, such as suicides and suicide
attempts.362 Life-threatening behavior, such as suicide attempts, also
present a significant cost to medical centers and local governments.363
Nationally, the economic costs for nonfatal injuries due to self-harm
are estimated at $3 billion a year for medical care.364 New York alone
reported that treating suicide attempts cost the state around $200
million in 2010.365 Given the statistics that show transgender youth
having a higher occurrence of suicide attempts than the cisgender
population, it is likely that a reduction in suicide attempts by
transgender youth would produce a significant decrease in the state’s
costs associated with suicide and attempted suicides. Research
indicates that hormone therapy and gender affirming surgery greatly
improve outcomes for transgender youth and reduce the rate of
clinical mental conditions.366 Therefore, removing the age restrictions

360. Medicaid,
EMPIRE
STATE
PRIDE
AGENDA
FOUND.,
http://www.prideagenda.org/advancing-justice/transgender-equality-justice/Medicaid
[https://perma.cc/WK4R-ND8K].
361. COHEN-KETTENIS & PFÄFFLIN, supra note 47, at 140.
362. Suicide: Consequences, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/suicide/consequences.html
[https://perma.cc/ZW2A-HCWA] (last updated Aug. 28, 2015); see RESEARCH AM.,
INVESTMENT IN RESEARCH SAVES LIVES AND MONEY: FACTS ABOUT: SUICIDE,
http://www.researchamerica.org/sites/default/files/uploads/factsheet21suicide.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H7G6-BRHL].
363. Stephanie Czernin et al., Cost of Attempted Suicide: A Retrospective Study
of Extent and Associated Factors, 142 SWISS MED. WKLY. 13648 (July 23, 2012).
364. Suicide, ABUSE: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND
TREATMENTS (Rosemarie Skaine ed., ABC-CLIO, LLC 2015), at 286.
365. N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF MENTAL HEALTH, DIV. OF QUALITY MGMT., GETTING
TO THE GOAL: SUICIDE AS A NEVER EVENT IN NEW YORK STATE (2014),
https://www.omh.ny.gov/omhweb/dqm/bqi/suicideasaneverevent.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3CFQ-WDNG].
366. Annelou L.C. de Vries et al., Young Adult Psychological Outcome After
Puberty Suppression and Gender Reassignment, 134 PEDIATRICS 1, 7 (Sept. 2014).
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would likely avoid costs that would be incurred to treat attempted
suicides.
While there are cost justifications for extending Medicaid coverage
of gender-affirming healthcare to transgender youth, any cost
incurred by a state may not be dispositive of extending coverage. The
purpose of the Medicaid Act is to help Americans obtain medically
necessary treatment that they cannot afford.367 A cost-benefits
analysis cannot therefore be determinative of Medicaid coverage.
Rather, the decision to extend Medicaid coverage to gender-affirming
healthcare should turn on the recognition that it is medically
necessary.
Given that the medical community and federal
government recognize that youth may need gender-affirming
healthcare, state Medicaid programs should extend coverage of this
treatment pursuant to the ultimate objectives of the Medicaid Act.
CONCLUSION
The past three years have seen enormous strides in strengthening
and improving the rights of transgender people. So much so, that
each of the past three years has been dubbed a “tipping point” for the
trans-rights movement, or the year of transgender visibility.368 Once
seen exclusively as comical or disturbing, transgender people and
bodies are now more visible throughout mainstream media.369 A

367. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 444 (1977) (“Title XIX’s broadly stated primary
objective to enable each State, as far as practicable, to furnish medical assistance to
individuals whose income and resources are insufficient to meet the costs of
necessary medical services.).
368. Samantha Allen & Nico Lang, 11 Ways 2014 was the Biggest Year in
ROLLING
STONE
(Dec.
23,
2014),
Transgender
History,
http://www.rollingstone.com/culture/features/11-ways-2014-was-the-biggest-year-intransgender-history-20141223 [https://perma.cc/T24A-S3WA]; Tracy Garza, 2012: An
Amazing
Year
for
Transgender
Rights,
TRANSGENDER
L.
CTR.,
http://transgenderlawcenter.org/archives/2773
[https://perma.cc/63P6-BZDX];
Brandon Griggs, America’s Transgender Moment, CNN (Apr. 25, 2015),
http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/23/living/transgender-moment-jenner-feat
[https://perma.cc/5RQA-QED6] (“It’s only April, but 2015 may be remembered as
the year the term ‘transgender’ fully entered mainstream consciousness.”); Paris
Lees, 2014, the Year of . . . Transgender Visibility, VICE (Dec. 29, 2014), https://id.vice.com/en_gb/article/2014-the-year-of-transgender-visibility
[https://perma.cc/EAM9-SR7H]; Parker Marie Malloy, Year in Review: 10 Important
Transgender
Moments
of
2013,
ADVOCATE
(Jan.
4,
2014),
http://www.advocate.com/year-review/2014/01/04/year-review-10-importanttransgender-moments-2013 [https://perma.cc/WFP2-A34H] (“concluding that 2013
was a true year of momentum”).
369. Calpernia Addams, Transsexual Clichés and Stereotypes in Film, Television
CALPERNIA.COM
(Aug.
31,
2009),
and
Print
Media,
http://www.calpernia.com/2009/08/transsexual-cliches-and-stereotypes-in-media
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study by GLAAD found that from 2002–2012, transgender characters
were disproportionately portrayed as villains, psychopathic killers, sex
workers, or victims.370 In more recent years, critically acclaimed
programs such as “Transparent” and “Orange is the New Black”
have removed transgender characters from the fringes, portraying
them instead as multidimensional individuals.371 Transgender actors
such as Laverne Cox have been inspiring examples of success among
the trans community.372 Transgender models such as Jazz Jennings
and Andreja Pejic are finding success, earning spreads or contracts
with notable magazines and companies.373 The process of transition
has also become more visible, and perhaps socially acceptable, as pop
culture icons such as Caitlyn Jenner openly discuss their process.374
President Obama also noted in his January 21, 2015 State of the
Union Address the need to protect the rights of transgender
individuals, the first time a United States President has acknowledged
transgender identities in the nationally televised speech.375

[https://perma.cc/G8RS-YA3K]; Matt Kane, Transgender Characters that Changed
Film
and
Television
#TransWK,
GLAAD
(Nov.
12,
2013),
http://www.glaad.org/blog/transgender-characters-changed-film-and-televisiontranswk [https://perma.cc/3FS4-A94W].
370. Victims or Villains: Examining Ten Years of Transgender Images on
GLAAD,
https://www.glaad.org/publications/victims-or-villainsTelevision,
examining-ten-years-transgender-images-television [https://perma.cc/5VKG-XMGR].
371. EJ Dickson, “She’s a Survivor,” SALON (Jul. 25, 2013, 12:15 PM),
http://www.salon.com/2013/07/25/laverne_cox_on_her_orange_is_the_new_black_cha
racter_shes_a_survivor [https://perma.cc/BJX8-C8U5]; Nico Lang, Op-ed, Orange is
the New Black Proves to Be the Model of Queer TV, ADVOCATE (Jun. 30, 2014, 6:30
AM),
http://www.advocate.com/commentary/2014/06/30/op-ed-orange-new-blackproves-be-model-queer-tv [https://perma.cc/B5JL-C88X]; Nora O’Donnell, How

Authentic Is ‘Transparent?’ A Transgender Activist on Jeffrey Tambor and Other
Portrayals,
INDIEWIRE
(Oct.
1,
2014,
10:28
AM),
http://www.indiewire.com/article/how-authentic-is-transparent-a-transgender-activiston-jeffrey-tambor-and-other-portrayals-20141001 [https://perma.cc/3ZKC-Q4GY].
372. Lees, supra note 368.
373. Alice Gregory, Has the Fashion Industry Reached a Transgender Turning
Point?, VOGUE (Apr. 21, 2015, 8:00 AM), http://www.vogue.com/13253741/andrejapejic-transgender-model [https://perma.cc/UBG6-CNWT]; Emanuella Grinberg, Why
Transgender Teen Jazz Jennings Is Everywhere, CNN (Mar. 19, 2015, 12;18 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2015/03/16/living/feat-transgender-teen-jazz-jennings
[https://perma.cc/R6MG-DDB5].
374. Daniel E. Slotnik, Bruce Jenner Says He’s Transitioning to a Woman, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 15, 2015, at B6.
375. President Obama stated: “As Americans, we respect human
dignity . . . [t]hat’s why we defend free speech, and advocate for political prisoners,
and condemn the prosecution of women, or religious minorities, or people who are
lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgender.” President Barack Obama, Remarks by the
President in State of the Union Address (Jan. 20, 2015) (transcript available at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/20/remarks-president-state-
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In addition to a shift in cultural norms, trans-rights advocates have
succeeded in changing laws and policies that had previously denied
transgender individuals’ basic rights. Legal advocacy organizations,
such as LAMDA, the Sylvia Rivera Project, the Legal Aid Society,
and the New York Legal Assistance Group, have brought legal
challenges to discriminatory practices and policies.376 Courts, in turn,
have begun to recognize employment discrimination on the basis of
gender identity as violating Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.377
Activists and allies have brought greater visibility to trans-rights
issues by launching powerful direct action and social media campaigns
aimed at challenging marginalizing policies, such as gendered public
accommodations.378 These changes have come about rapidly, as the
APA only reclassified GD so as to remove the label of “disorder” in
2012. Thus, the trans-rights movement has fundamentally altered
public policy and opinions surrounding the rights and lives of
transgender individuals.
Despite these advances, transgender individuals, and in particular
transgender people of color, still find themselves subjected to
discrimination, hate, and violence.
In early 2015, advocacy
organizations noted a disturbing trend of transphobic hate crimes.379
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Within the first three months of the year, Human Rights Campaign
reported seven murders of transgender women, and all but one of the
women killed were women of color.380 Such events suggest that
society has not yet fully embraced transgender identities.
Transgender youth still remain constant targets of harassment, abuse,
and rejection, as is tragically evidenced by news reports of
transgender youth who commit suicide.381 These events continue well
after Leelah Alcorn’s words, “[f]ix society,” captured the public’s
attention.382
Enacting state Medicaid programs that provide low-income
transgender youth with coverage of gender-affirming healthcare
would improve the lives of this group of transgender individuals by
providing access to medically necessary healthcare and by leaving a
lasting impact on the way society views transgender identity. The
medical community has recognized that one’s gender identity may not
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correspond with one’s assigned sex at birth, and that individuals,
including youth, may experience clinically significant distress termed
gender dysphoria. Despite the fact that medical experts agree that
gender-affirming healthcare may be medically necessary for some
transgender youth, some states, such as New York, do not extend
Medicaid coverage for gender dysphoria for individuals under the age
of eighteen. Age restrictions on Medicaid coverage give rise to
possible violations of the Medicaid Act, legal claims under the
Affordable Care Act, contradictions with principles of informed
consent, and a myriad of negative outcomes. States could avoid these
issues by aligning their programs with the WPATH Standards of
Care, and doing so would avoid a number of costs and provide
individuals with care that they need but cannot afford.
Providing transgender youth with access to affordable transition
healthcare, however, would also create a lasting impact on society’s
view of transgender identity. States have already recognized the
medical necessity of gender-affirming healthcare for adults, and in
doing so have recognized that transitioning is a process that many
individuals must go through in order to live happy and functional
lives. By extending this coverage to transgender youth, states would
recognize the existence of gender non-conforming youth. It would
encourage private insurers to extend similar coverage, which in turn
would motivate healthcare providers, employers, and schools to
recognize gender non-conforming youth.
In short, extending
Medicaid coverage of gender-affirming healthcare to transgender
youth would validate gender non-conforming identities. While the
immediate impact of this validation may be seen in the healthcare
that transgender youth receive, the ramifications would likely be seen
on a much broader, social level.

